I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsSub-Saharan Africa
From Johannesburg, Washington swaps African aid for minerals and data
- Institution
- South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
- Author
- Ava Brazell, Bennett Reddig
- Country · language
- South Africa · English
- Affiliation
- Independent think tank (Johannesburg)
Summary
In a piece published on 20 October, Ava Brazell and Bennett Reddig of SAIIA's African Governance and Diplomacy programme argue that the Trump administration is replacing aid to Africa with deals that trade market access for minerals, data and political alignment. By the authors' count, $17.3 billion of US aid was committed to sub-Saharan Africa in 2024 and about $16 billion actually disbursed; commitments for 2026 stand at roughly $1.3 billion so far. In June 2026 the administration announced it would end PEPFAR funding for HIV programmes in South Africa, though unlike the abrupt closure of USAID the programme is being wound down in stages. The authors note that Britain and some EU states also cut aid in 2026, but set the US apart for the speed of its retreat and for openly trading aid for commercial deals.
The new model, they write, rests on 3 pillars. In Congo, the arrangement built after the peace over the M23 conflict follows a resources-for-security logic that gives the US access to minerals such as coltan, and Congolese lawyers have taken the deal to court. On health, 3 countries are pushing back. Ghana rejected a US health agreement over a requirement to share sensitive health data, and Zimbabwe because there was no guarantee of research benefits; in Kenya a court ruled against a similar agreement. Tanzania, by contrast, signed a health memorandum worth $1.3 billion over 5 years. The authors recall that the 2001 Abuja Declaration called for 15% of budgets to go to health, while the average in 2024 was 7%.
The piece's 7-point set of recommendations is aimed at bargaining power. Each memorandum should be weighed for its risks to human rights, displacement and wages against a reassessment of domestic health financing; dependence on a single partner should be avoided, and negotiations should run through the African Union. The authors add safeguards on wages, the environment and security to the 7 points. One recommendation is to hold back from these deals until political conditions in the US change; the authors concede that rejecting a lopsided offer is hard when the need is urgent.
Blind spot
The piece measures the US retreat against the $17.3 billion committed in 2024, but does not compare the terms on which China, the Gulf or the EU are filling the gap. It offers no 2026 data on how the Congo minerals deal has affected wages and living standards; the critique reads intent more than contract text. Nor does it examine why Tanzania signed the $1.3 billion memorandum, the case of a country that cannot say no.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The piece documents US aid turning into a commercial bargain in practice as it falls from $16 billion disbursed to $1.3 billion committed. African governments' bargaining power depends on budget need, as Ghana's and Zimbabwe's refusals and Tanzania's acceptance show. The most likely path is that high-need countries sign deals one by one while a collective stance at African Union level stays weak.
Likely effects
- Health financingNegative1–6 months
On a continent where health takes only 7% of budgets, the PEPFAR wind-down leaves the burden of HIV programmes to unprepared domestic budgets.
- Critical minerals competitionUncertain6 months+
A model that trades mineral access for security and aid hardens great-power competition over African mining through contract terms.
- Legal and political riskNegative1–6 months
The case in Congo and the court ruling in Kenya show that memoranda signed with the US can be reversed under domestic law, clouding investment timelines.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Bilateral memoranda spread55%
Countries with large budget gaps follow the Tanzania model and health and mining deals are signed one at a time.
Watch: Another African country signing a health or minerals memorandum with the US
- 2Selective refusal30%
More countries turn down offers as Ghana and Zimbabwe did, over data-sharing and mining terms.
Watch: A government or court rejecting a US memorandum
- 3African Union collective bargaining15%
The African Union announces a joint negotiating framework and bilateral deals are tied to it.
Watch: An African Union decision on a common position on US deals
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: saiia.org.za · 21 October 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.