Track record

The published claim

H1 · 50% — Synchronised tightening, premiums in a high band: energy stays high, developed and emerging-market premiums settle at 21 September levels, and France stays above Italy.

What happened

The direction held, but the level proved harsher than expected. Premiums did not stabilise on 21 September; they widened further. France's 5-year CDS rose from 47.19 on 21 September to 57.42 basis points on 24 September. Italy stayed at 45.12 the same day, so France remained above Italy. Germany rose from 8.49 to 9.50, and Türkiye from 242.43 to 245.17.

The published claim

H2 · 30% — Energy retreats, premiums narrow: Brent settles well below 100 dollars, part of the 21 September widening is reversed, and Türkiye's CDS could return to around 230.

What happened

The trigger did not materialise. Instead of falling below 100 dollars, Brent rose to 106.60 dollars on 24 September and again topped 106 dollars at the Asian open on 28 September. Türkiye's CDS did not return to 230; on 25 September it crossed 250 for the first time since 27 May.

The published claim

H3 · 20% — A break at the core: the France–Germany spread exceeds 110 basis points and France's CDS passes 50; the ECB is caught between fragmentation risk and tightening.

What happened

Half of the trigger materialised. France's 5-year CDS rose above 50, to 55.98 basis points on 23 September and 57.42 on 24 September. Sources diverge on the France–Germany 10-year spread. Calculated from 28 September closes (France 4.78%, Germany 3.63%), it is about 115 basis points, while another provider gives 105.4 for 25 September. We could not verify with a single consistent series that the threshold was crossed. Nor is there any record of the ECB changing policy in response to fragmentation risk.

The published claim

Threshold: Türkiye's CDS exceeding 250 basis points would show the Turkish premium moving beyond the bloc-wide move, with country-specific pressure added.

What happened

The threshold was crossed on 25 September, when Türkiye's CDS rose above 250 for the first time since 27 May. The source of country-specific pressure was also clearly visible: the liquidation of 131 funds worth about 18 billion dollars and a widening fund investigation.

The published claim

Threshold: the US 10-year yield exceeding 5.05% would show the dollar discount rate moving into a new, higher band.

What happened

The threshold was crossed on 23 September. After hot PMI data, the 10-year yield rose to 5.10%, its highest level since 2007. The same day the US Treasury sold 5-year notes at 5.033%.

The published claim

First link in the chain: tightening is written at the front end; the problem lies in price, not demand. The reading that 'yields are rising because demand is weakening' was flagged as noise.

What happened

The price leg held, but we were wrong on demand. The 5-year auction cleared at 5.033% and the 7-year auction on 24 September at 5.085%, the highest rate since April 1993. Yet indirect demand at the 7-year auction fell to 57.2%. In Germany, a 5 billion euro Bobl auction on 23 September drew bids of only 4.53 billion. Weak demand was not noise but a second signal.

The published claim

Thresholds: Japan's 30-year yield exceeding 4.21% and Germany's 30-year yield exceeding 4.00% would show tightening moving out to the long end.

What happened

Neither threshold has yet been crossed. Japan's 30-year yield closed at 4.16% on 25 September and Germany's 30-year yield at 3.91% the same day. The check has not yet matured; the verdict is deferred to the next review.

The published claim

H1 · 50% — Conditional opening, slow normalisation: Iran confirms the offer at the UN, the US gradually eases the blockade; the 20% penalty regime takes effect but is applied selectively, and transits rise over several weeks.

What happened

The central trigger of the scenario we rated most likely did not materialise. The offer was confirmed: Araghchi told the UN General Assembly on 25 September that the Strait of Hormuz would open at the end of day 7, on condition that the blockade and oil sanctions were lifted. But the US did not ease the blockade. Trump rejected the 7-day roadmap on 26 September, and the blockade has turned back 122 ships in total. Transits did not rise: 9 on 24 September and single digits on 25 September. Brent did not fall; it rose to 106.60 dollars on 24 September. Because the negotiating channel has not closed, this branch could still open later; within the review window, however, it was proven wrong.

The published claim

H2 · 35% — Offer collapses, status quo holds: the offer is not officially confirmed, the blockade continues and the penalty articles become law; transits stay in single digits per day, the Yanbu outlet is loaded up and Brent could rise above 100 dollars again.

What happened

The outcome held, but the mechanism did not. Transits stayed in single digits (9 on 24 September), and Brent closed above 100 dollars at 106.60 dollars on 24 September and 104.32 dollars on 25 September. The Yanbu outlet became both a load and a target: the Houthis fired 6 ballistic missiles at Yanbu and Taif on 24 September, and France sent air defences to Yanbu. The first leg of the trigger was wrong, however: the offer was confirmed, with Araghchi presenting it openly at the UN on 25 September. The status quo came not from an Iranian retreat but from the US rejection on 26 September. There is no recorded evidence that the penalty articles passed the plenary.

The published claim

H3 · 15% — Tension escalates: a ship is seized under the 20% penalty regime or a new tanker attack occurs, and the US responds; risk also rises on the Red Sea side.

What happened

The trigger did not materialise: our records for 24–27 September show no seizure under the penalty regime and no new tanker attack in the Strait of Hormuz. The scenario's impact leg nonetheless arrived without the trigger. Risk rose on the Red Sea side: the Houthis fired missiles and drones at Yanbu on 24 September and at Riyadh and Khamis Mushait on 25–26 September. The escalation thus came from the Yemen front rather than the legal regime in Hormuz, and the scenario, as we wrote it, was proven wrong.

The published claim

Primary watch item: official confirmation of Iran's 7-day offer and the daily count of Hormuz transits. If confirmation arrives and transits exceed 20 for several days in a row, diplomacy is turning into physical flows.

What happened

The indicator drew the right distinction: confirmation came, but flows did not. The offer was presented at the UN on 25 September by Foreign Minister Araghchi rather than Pezeshkian. Transits did not reach 20 on any day: 10 on 23 September (later revised to 14), 9 on 24 September and single digits on 25 September, with a 10-day average of 18. Diplomacy stayed on the table without turning into physical flows; Trump's claim of 29 ships could not be verified with independent data.

The published claim

Secondary watch item: the length of the tariff truce extension from the 24 September Xi–Trump summit. Under 6 months would mean a brief, conditional timetable; close to 2 years would mean the magnet leverage is working.

What happened

The extension proved brief. Bessent announced on 23 September that the truce due to expire on 10 November had been extended to 10 January, only 2 months. The 24 September summit ended without a joint statement and produced no tariff cuts, chip licences or rare earth decisions. China's planned restrictions on 7 additional rare earth metals were also postponed to 10 January 2027. The brief, conditional timetable branch in our reading materialised.

The published claim

The confluence reading (the disruption is being booked as a cost item lasting quarters) is falsified if all three occur in the same period: core PCE falling below 3% for two months running, the 2-year auction yield returning to its August level, and France's premium dropping back below Italy's.

What happened

The falsifier has not come due, as it depends on two months of PCE data; the first test is on 30 September. The interim picture supports the reading. The 2-year yield stood at 4.87% on 24 September, well above 4.204% at the August auction, and the 7-year auction closed at 5.085%, the highest rate since 1993. France's 5-year CDS stood at 57.42 on 24 September, still above Italy's 45.12.

The published claim

H1 · 55% — Talks continue, transits stay low: the mediator channel remains open but the US publishes no written plan; visible transits stay in single digits and Brent fluctuates in a 95–105 dollar band.

What happened

The political and physical legs held. Araghchi met Witkoff and Kushner on 25 September under Qatari mediation, the US published no written plan, and Trump rejected the offer on 26 September. Transits were 9 on 24 September and in single digits on 25 September. The price band, however, was breached for one day: Brent closed at 106.60 dollars on 24 September and returned to the band at 104.32 dollars on 25 September. The breach came not from a collapse of talks but from the Houthi attack on Yanbu.

The published claim

H2 · 30% — Phased opening timetable: the White House announces a plan to ease the blockade or halt operations, and Iran runs its 7-day clock; transits rise above 10 ships and the front end of the crude curve falls markedly.

What happened

The trigger did not materialise. The White House announced no plan, Trump rejected Iran's 7-day roadmap on 26 September, and the blockade has turned back 122 ships in total. Transits did not rise durably above 10 (9 on 24 September). Rather than falling, Brent rose from 98.50 dollars on 22 September to 104.32 dollars on 25 September.

The published claim

H3 · 15% — Penalty regime kicks in: the bill passes the plenary and Iran enforces its first detention or 20% penalty case; Brent returns above 105 dollars.

What happened

The trigger did not materialise: our records for 24–27 September contain no evidence that the bill passed the plenary, nor of a first detention or penalty case. The scenario's price outcome did arrive, but through another channel. Brent rose above 105 to 106.60 dollars on 24 September, driven by the 6 ballistic missiles the Houthis fired at Yanbu and Taif.

The published claim

Threshold: Brent rising above 105 dollars was to be read as the zone where a collapse of talks, or the start of penalty enforcement, had passed into prices.

What happened

The threshold was crossed, but our interpretation proved wrong. Brent closed at 106.60 dollars on 24 September. Talks had not collapsed that day; the next day Araghchi presented the 7-day plan at the UN, and the penalty regime was not being enforced. What pushed the price above the threshold was the Houthi attack on Yanbu, the outlet of the East–West pipeline that bypasses Hormuz. Tying the threshold to a single channel was a mistake.

The published claim

Chain link 1: unless the White House publishes a written plan on the blockade or operations, visible transits stay in single digits; the offer's condition is tested on the ground.

What happened

The link held: no written plan came and transits stayed in single digits. According to Reuters-sourced data, 9 commodity ships passed on 24 September, 8 of them outbound; the 10-day average was 18. The figure for 23 September was revised from 10 to 14, and it should be noted that preliminary data were later revised upwards. The pre-war baseline was about 125 ships a day.

The published claim

Chain link 2: if the penalty articles go to the plenary while the opening is delayed, the strait's legal regime changes and the floor of the war-risk premium stays elevated.

What happened

The link's horizon was set in weeks and has not yet expired. As of 28 September our records contain no evidence that the bill has been voted on in the plenary; articles 13–15, approved by the committee on 22 September, are pending. We have not collected a new dated value for the war-risk premium.

The published claim

H3 · 20% — The demand diagnosis wins: US data confirm that inflation is demand-driven, the Fed moves to a harsher, front-loaded path, the dollar strengthens and emerging-market premia widen indiscriminately.

What happened

The scenario to which we gave the lowest probability was the one most fully realised within five days. On 23 September Barr and Collins signalled an additional hike; the probability of an October hike rose from 55% to 70% within the day, and the dollar index moved above 101. On 24 September Paulson said moderate additional tightening might be needed, and jobless claims fell to 197,000. On 25 September the US 30-year yield rose to 5.50%. Premia widened as a bloc: Argentina's country risk reached a six-month high of 609 basis points on 25 September, and Türkiye's CDS rose above 250 for the first time since 27 May. The decisive test of the data leg of the demand diagnosis is the PCE release on 30 September; however, the Fed path and the market leg have already materialised.

The published claim

H1 · 50% — The spread stays wide: Strait of Hormuz traffic stays low, Russian refining losses accumulate and the diagnostic split within the Fed persists; while crude eases, refined products and the risk premium stay expensive.

What happened

Two of the three triggers held and one did not. Hormuz stayed low: 7 transits on 22 September, between 10 and 14 on 23 September, and 9 on 24 September. Russian refining losses accumulated: Perm and Novoshakhtinsk halted on 25 September. But the split within the Fed did not persist; it converged on the hawkish side. The scenario's price premise also proved wrong: crude did not ease, Brent rose to $106.60 on 24 September and closed at $104.32 on 25 September, roughly 4.3% above the $100.05 of 22 September. The leg about the risk premium staying expensive was confirmed.

The published claim

H2 · 30% — Diplomacy turns into traffic: contacts on the margins of the UN General Assembly bear fruit, the weekly transit count in the Strait of Hormuz approaches its pre-war band, and Brent and the product premium retreat together.

What happened

The trigger did not materialise within the review window, and the price moved in the opposite direction. Diplomacy stayed on the table but did not turn into traffic: on 25 September Iran offered to open the strait at the end of the seventh day if the blockade and sanctions were lifted, and Rubio said this was not a breakthrough. Transits stayed between 7 and 14 a day; the pre-war baseline, according to sources, is 85 to 125 ships a day. Brent did not retreat; it rose. Because the negotiating track has not closed, this branch may reopen later; however, in the form we wrote it, as an outcome of UN week, it did not materialise.

The published claim

The sanctions regime is shifting from prohibition to a bargaining chip, and the compliance burden is moving to third-country intermediaries. This reading is disproved if Usmanov or Fridman is put back on the EU list, an equivalent independent monitoring mechanism replaces the UN panel, and no new designations target third-country intermediaries.

What happened

None of the three legs of the falsifier materialised; on the contrary, the burden kept shifting to third countries. On 23 September the Central Bank of the UAE barred Bank Melli Iran's 8 branches in the country from trade finance and money transfers involving Iran: the decision was taken not by a sanctioning state but by the regulator of an intermediary country exposed to secondary sanctions risk. Usmanov and Fridman were not put back on the list, and no mechanism replaced the UN panel. The reading stands.

The published claim

Secondary watch item: the first common observation day after 21 September on the sovereign risk premium panel; the series for eight countries, Türkiye included, stopped on 18 September, and it was unknown whether they had joined the bloc move.

What happened

The question has been answered: Türkiye joined the bloc. In the Investing series the 24 September close was 245.17; according to BloombergHT, on 25 September the CDS exceeded 250 for the first time since 27 May. However, part of Türkiye's widening came through a domestic channel: in the same days the liquidation of 131 funds worth $18 billion and the MASAK investigation were under way. Participation in the bloc move is confirmed; attributing the entire move to the global channel would not be accurate.

The published claim

Ripple chain: uncertainty over the dollar discount rate widens premia at bloc level, country calendars run into the premium, and if the calendar does not pass cleanly Türkiye's external financing cost rises without any country-specific news. Watch: whether Türkiye's 5-year risk premium rises above 232.80 basis points of 18 September.

What happened

The chain's watch indicator crossed the threshold: Türkiye's 5-year CDS rose to 245.17 on 24 September and, according to BloombergHT, above 250 on 25 September for the first time since 27 May; the report's threshold of tr-cds > 250 was also breached. The US 30-year yield reached 5.50% on 25 September. However, the chain's premise of 'without country-specific news' did not hold: in the same days the liquidation of 131 funds worth $18 billion and the MASAK investigation opened a Türkiye-specific channel. The outcome was confirmed, but not the whole mechanism.

The published claim

H3 · 20% — The demand diagnosis wins: the Fed moves to a harsher, front-loaded path, the dollar strengthens, and emerging-market premia widen indiscriminately.

What happened

On 23 September Barr and Collins signalled an additional hike; the probability of an October hike rose to 70% and the dollar index moved above 101. In Latin America premia kept widening: Argentina's country risk rose from 533 on 21 September to 609 basis points on 25 September. The decisive test of the data leg is the PCE release on 30 September.

The published claim

H2 · 30% — The calendar passes cleanly: Argentina makes its 25 September payment and the review concludes favourably, the 28 September Washington round yields a tariff cut, Brazil's election ends with a market-friendly framework; the widening of 21 September is reversed.

What happened

Only one of the three triggers came due, and it did not produce the effect we expected: Argentina paid the IMF roughly $795 million, but on the same day country risk rose 31 points to 609 and reserves fell to $48.2 billion. The assumption that the payment would lower the premium proved wrong on this leg. Because the 28 September USMCA round and the 4 October Brazilian election have not yet taken place, the scenario remains open as a whole.

The published claim

Premise: European storage enters winter at 68.5% full, about 16 points below the seasonal average; the gap is a structural fragility.

What happened

The gap has not closed. On gas day 23 September EU storage held 796 TWh of 1,132 TWh capacity, 70.3% full; that is 15.7 points below the 2021–2025 average of 86.0% and also below the five-year low of 72.6%. Germany, at 57.12%, is 19.3 points behind the same day of 2025. In the six days since 17 September the fill level rose 1.8 points, while the gap to the average narrowed from about 16 points to 15.7 points, only a few tenths of a point.

The published claim

H1 · 50% — The two-way squeeze persists: the Hormuz constraint and reduced Qatari LNG flows continue, the EU storage gap stays in the 16-point band; Europe keeps competing with Asia for cargoes.

What happened

Both conditions of the trigger are in place as of 25 September: transits observed through Hormuz on 24 September were 9, with a ten-day average of 18; before the war there were about 125 large vessels a day. The EU gap stands at 15.7 points. Iran's proposal of 25 September to open within 7 days is only a proposal; the US did not treat it as a breakthrough. Because the scenario was defined over the whole winter, the verdict is open; we have not recorded data to measure the effect of the cargo competition on the Asian side.

The published claim

H2 · 25% — Supply partly normalises: Norwegian maintenance ends, Qatari flows through Hormuz partly reopen and spot LNG falls towards a 10-dollar floor.

What happened

The Hormuz condition did not materialise: according to Kpler data only 3 commodity vessels transited the strait on 22 September, and on 23 September the Cape Dao was hit and a seafarer was killed. We have written no records since publication on the end of Norwegian maintenance or on the Asian spot LNG price. The branch did not advance in this window, but it has not reached maturity.

The published claim

H3 · 25% — Cold snap and second outage: an early cold snap accelerates withdrawals while seven fields close in Libya or an Armenia-type outage recurs; the outage passes directly into price.

What happened

The Libyan leg was partly triggered: on the night of 21 September valve no. 7 on the line linking Sharara to Zawiya was closed and the NOC reported a loss of about 130,000 barrels a day; on 23 September the Zawiya refinery stopped. The closure of seven fields did not happen, and there is no cold snap. Brent rose to 106.60 dollars on 24 September, but the Houthi missile strike on Yanbu the same day makes it impossible to separate the price move from Libya.

The published claim

Threshold: EU storage falling below 65%, the zone where Europe would keep competing for cargoes out of necessity rather than choice.

What happened

The threshold was not approached; the level moved away from it: the fill rate rose from 68.5% on 17 September to 70.3% on 23 September. As the withdrawal season has not begun, the threshold has not yet been tested. Sources diverge: Global Energy Flow sees the daily pace of 0.21 points as falling short of the 80% target for 1 November, while Voltstack considers winter preparation on track at the current base.

The published claim

H1 · 50% — The shortage becomes entrenched: repairs at AVT-3 and AVT-4 drag on, capacity does not return at the facilities hit, the ban is extended beyond 31 October; pump price rises in Türkiye continue at intervals.

What happened

The Russian side was more than confirmed: on 20 September two distillation units at the Moscow Refinery burned, on 21–22 September Kuibyshev and Ufa were hit, and Ukraine's General Staff announced that more than 45% of Russian refining capacity was out of action. The date of the ban leg is 31 October and has not yet arrived. The Türkiye leg, however, did not play out as we wrote: diesel fell from 100.40 lira on 17 September to 90.90 lira on 24 September and returned to 93.45 lira on 25 September after a 2.55-lira rise. The pump tracked Brent and the exchange rate, not Russian capacity.

The published claim

H2 · 30% — Gradual normalisation: repairs progress, the pace of attacks slows and the ban ends on 31 October without extension.

What happened

The opposite of the condition happened. Two days after publication, on 20 September, both distillation units at the Moscow Refinery, of 21,400 and 18,800 tonnes a day, burned and the facility stopped processing; Russia said it downed 1,110 drones the same night. On 22 September the capacity loss exceeded 45%, and on the night of 23 September Ufa was attacked again. The pace did not slow; it escalated.

The published claim

H3 · 20% — Second shock wave: new deep strikes also cut the remaining primary distillation capacity, or the exchange rate passes 50 lira; the intervals between price rises shorten and competition for substitute supply hardens.

What happened

The first half of the trigger materialised within four days: primary distillation capacity at Moscow, Kuibyshev and Ufa went out of action on 20–22 September. The currency half did not; the dollar/lira rate set a record at 48.84 on 23 September but stayed below 50. The expected effect was not seen in Türkiye: the intervals between price rises did not shorten, and a 5.5-lira cut came on 24 September. The trigger to which we gave 20% materialised; the outcome we tied to it did not.

The published claim

Step 2: Even if the dollar price of the product stays flat, the exchange rate raises the lira cost of imported fuel; the indicators are how close the dollar/lira rate is to the 50-lira threshold and successive diesel price rises.

What happened

The currency moved as in the report: the dollar/lira rate rose from 48.67 on 17 September to 48.82 on 21 September and 48.84 on 23 September, setting new records twice. The 50 threshold was not crossed. The series of successive price rises, however, was broken: the cut on 24 September was attributed to Brent falling to 98.53 dollars, and the rise on 25 September was explained by Brent's return to 100.79 dollars and an exchange rate of 48.87. The currency channel is working but has not reached the threshold.

The published claim

Threshold: Türkiye's 10-year benchmark yield exceeding 34% would signal that domestic borrowing costs will create a second jump in the interest line of the budget deficit.

What happened

The threshold was not crossed: the 10-year yield stood at 32.64% on 24 September. Pressure concentrated at the front end of the curve; the 2-year yield rose from 36.43% on 23 September to 37.09% on 24 September, overtaking the 37% policy rate. The horizon was written as months; the verdict awaits monthly budget outturns.

The published claim

Condition that breaks the chain: if the proposal for a pause in reciprocal attacks on energy infrastructure is accepted, Russian export capacity recovers, Ukraine's grid gets relief and refined product prices fall back.

What happened

The condition did not materialise; the reading stands. On 22 September Zelensky discussed an energy ceasefire with Trump and said he was ready for any form of it; the Kremlin called the proposal a good idea but put forward sanctions and tanker security as preconditions. The same night Russia struck the Naftogaz facility in Poltava with at least 5 ballistic missiles. The energy ceasefire Trump floated on 14 September found no response on the ground.

The published claim

H1 · 60% — The infrastructure war continues: the front stays largely static, both sides keep attacking energy infrastructure; Russian product exports stay low and Ukraine's grid enters winter fragile.

What happened

The infrastructure leg was confirmed in both directions. Ukraine hit the AVT-3 unit at YANOS on 17 September, the Moscow Refinery on 20 September, and Kuibyshev and Ufa on 21–22 September; the General Staff announced that more than 45% of Russian refining capacity was out of action. Russia struck the Naftogaz facility in Poltava on 22 September and data centres in Kyiv on 23 September. We published no territorial data to check the static-front leg; this half could not be audited.

The published claim

H2 · 20% — Mutual pause: a reciprocal pause in attacks on energy infrastructure is accepted; Russian export capacity recovers and refined product prices fall back.

What happened

It did not happen within eleven days and the pace of attacks increased; on the night of 20 September Russia said it had downed 1,110 drones. But the branch is not closed: Moscow left a conditional door open, and on 23 September, after meeting Lavrov, Rubio said both sides had shown interest in a limited ceasefire covering grain and energy targets. As no horizon was written, no verdict was given.

The published claim

H3 · 20% — The front gets moving: Ukraine's Lyman offensive widens or Russia launches a new major offensive; territorial change accelerates.

What happened

After 15 September we have no published event record on territorial change at Lyman or along the front line; nor do we yet have September territorial balance data. No verdict was given without evidence.

The published claim

Step 1: Port and refinery strikes constrain Russian export revenue more effectively than sanctions; the indicator is whether loadings at Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga recover.

What happened

A strong sign came that the port channel remains impaired: on 23 September the Krasnodar region declared a state of emergency backdated to 12 August, and August's attacks were reported to have knocked out about 90% of the region's grain export capacity. But the indicator we tracked was oil loadings; Novorossiysk's daily shipment figure could not be verified, and we recorded no data at all for Ust-Luga.

The published claim

Threshold: EU gas storage remaining below 80%, the zone where Europe enters winter more exposed to attacks on energy infrastructure.

What happened

EU storage stood at 70.3% on gas day 23 September: 15.7 points below the 2021–2025 average and 11.7 points below 2025; Germany is at 57.12%. It remains below the threshold. The daily fill pace is about 0.21 points; sources diverge on whether the 80% target for 1 November will be reached. As the horizon is winter, the verdict is open.

The published claim

H1 · 55% — Prolonged siege: the East–West pipeline stays closed for weeks, the Salalah corridor is not applied; the physical squeeze continues.

What happened

The pipeline leg proved wrong: the line, shut by a drone attack on 13 September, restarted at low flow on 22 September, 9 days later; full capacity was reported to take weeks. The physical squeeze leg held: only 10 commodity vessels transited Hormuz on 23 September, and reopening the strait remained dependent on Iran–US negotiations. No evidence was found that the Salalah corridor has been applied.

The published claim

H2 · 25% — Partial reopening: the pipeline reopens within days and the Iran–Oman corridor operates in a limited way; the spot price falls rapidly towards futures.

What happened

The pipeline leg materialised (22 September, low flow). The spot–futures gap narrowed but did not close: the FRED spot series fell from 130.80 dollars on 15 September to 114.89 dollars on 22 September, while futures stood at around 100 dollars on 22 September. Transits did not increase; there are no data showing the Iran–Oman corridor operating, and all vessels exiting on 22 September used the northern (Iranian) corridor. On 24 September the Houthis firing a ballistic missile at Yanbu made the export port of the reopened line a target as well.

The published claim

Threshold: Brent exceeding 120 dollars would mark the zone where futures start to track spot and the disruption is no longer seen as temporary.

What happened

In the series in which we set the threshold (FRED spot), 120 dollars was exceeded after publication as well: 127.84 dollars on 16 September, 121.18 dollars on 17 September. But what we wrote as the meaning of the threshold, futures tracking spot, did not happen: Brent futures have not approached 120 dollars since publication, with the highest close at 106.60 dollars on 24 September. We defined the threshold in one series and its meaning in another.

The published claim

Threshold: daily transits through Hormuz exceeding 40 vessels would be the first physical evidence that the corridor is actually operating.

What happened

The threshold was not crossed; this is consistent with the siege reading that the corridor is not operating, but the threshold itself has not yet been tested: according to IMF PortWatch, the highest daily transit count between 16 and 20 September was 7; according to Kpler's revised data, 4 commodity vessels transited on 21 September, 7 on 22 September and 10 on 23 September. Kpler's initial figures are revised upwards by as much as double the following day.

The published claim

Threshold: daily transits through Suez falling below 35 vessels would show territorial control on the Red Sea route feeding through to trade.

What happened

The threshold was not crossed after publication: according to IMF PortWatch, Suez transits on 16–20 September were 37, 37, 51, 43 and 42 vessels. 27 vessels transited Bab el-Mandeb on 23 September. The impact of territorial control on trade cannot yet be measured; the threshold remains under watch.

The published claim

H1 · 55% — Truce extended, technology front hardens: the tariff truce is extended by a year at the summit, while chip controls and distillation measures remain.

What happened

The direction held, the duration did not. The truce was extended, but by two months rather than a year: on 23 September Bessent moved the end date from 10 November to 10 January. There was no easing of chip controls; the issue was not raised at the summit, and the hardening is coming not from the executive but from the 3 chip bills in the Senate defence package (committee votes 42-0, 36-8, 42-2). No statement on distillation measures could be found from the summit; this part could not be verified.

The published claim

H2 · 20% — Comprehensive détente: a tariff cut and permission for some chip sales are announced at the summit.

What happened

No joint statement came out of the summit and no tariff cut was announced; average tariffs remained at 36.5% on the US side and 31% on the Chinese side. No new chip sales permission was granted. Bessent leaving a bigger package open for January pushes this scenario to a later date, but it did not materialise at the summit in the form we wrote on 15 September.

The published claim

H3 · 25% — Rupture: the summit is cancelled or China responds to the distillation warning with a concrete countermeasure; the truce expires on 10 November.

What happened

The summit took place on 24 September, China announced no countermeasure and the truce will not expire on 10 November: the end date was postponed to 10 January. China's preparations to restrict 7 additional rare earth metals were also moved to 10 January 2027.

The published claim

Step 1: once model access becomes a security issue, expectations of easing in chip export controls weaken; the gauge to watch is whether the joint summit statement addresses artificial intelligence and chip controls.

What happened

No easing came: no joint statement was published, chip controls did not come to the table, and as of 24 September there was no signed text for the artificial intelligence incident notification line. H200 licences remained on paper, Chinese customs blocked purchases and Congress is preparing new restrictions.

The published claim

Threshold: the dollar/lira exceeding 52 would mark the zone where global technology and trade tensions feed through to emerging market currencies.

What happened

The threshold was not crossed: the dollar/lira stood at around 48.87 on 24 September. The market reaction after the summit was limited; the S&P 500 fell 0.02% and bond yields set the tone of the day. As the truce has been extended to 10 January, this threshold will be checked again up to that date.

The published claim

Premise: the Fed tightened on 16 September and the ECB on 10 September; the Bank of Japan is expected to raise its rate to 1.25% on 18 September. Three major central banks are responding to an energy-driven supply shock in the same week by suppressing demand.

What happened

The expected third leg materialised: on 18 September the Bank of Japan raised its rate from 1% to 1.25%, the highest in 31 years, by a 7–2 vote. The premise that three central banks tightened within the same weekly window thus became fact.

The published claim

Step 1: tightening does not stay confined to near-term rates; fiscal deficit concerns also pull the far end of the curve higher. The gauge to watch is the US 30-year yield relative to the 5.5% threshold.

What happened

Transmission was delayed at first, then arrived. On 17 September the 10-year yield eased from 5.04% to 4.94%, and the 30-year fell to 5.29% on 21 September; in that window the chain appeared not to hold. On 23 September the 70 billion dollar 5-year auction tailed at 5.033%, the 10-year yield rose to 5.10%, its highest since 2007, and the 30-year to 5.39%. The far end was pulled higher; the 5.5% threshold, however, has not yet been breached.

The published claim

H1 · 55% — Patient tightness: the Fed delivers one more hike by year-end, the CBRT holds its rate, and oil stays above 100 dollars.

What happened

No verdict was issued as the horizon is year-end. The oil leg is oscillating around the line: Brent futures fell from 104.82 dollars on 17 September to below 100 dollars on 22 September (98.44–99.25 dollars depending on the source), then rebounded by about 4% to 103.31 dollars on 23 September.

The published claim

Threshold: Türkiye's 5-year CDS exceeding 250 basis points would mark the zone where the risk premium fully prices in the energy bill channel.

What happened

The threshold was not breached, but the direction matches the report's reading: CDS stood at 232.97 basis points on publication day, 16 September, and rose to 242.43 on 21 September. Over the same period the dollar/lira stayed below the 52 threshold at 48.81 on 22 September.

The published claim

Long-term borrowing costs are no longer set by central banks but by defence and coalition arithmetic. This reading is disproved if the French–German 10-year spread falls durably below 80 basis points, the UK 30-year gilt yield drops at least 50 basis points below 5.89%, and the Bundestag cuts Germany's 2027 defence line.

What happened

None of the three conditions occurred; the opposite did. On 19 September the French–German 10-year spread passed 100 basis points for the first time since 2012, and on 22 September it reached 102, putting Paris 12.7 basis points above Italy's 89.3. There was no easing in the UK either: August borrowing rose to £18.3bn and debt interest payments hit a record £8.8bn. There is no Bundestag decision cutting the defence line. The reading stands.

The published claim

S1 · 50% — Prolonged siege: Hormuz stays shut, the corridor is not applied, the East–West line stays closed for weeks; the Fed makes one more hike by year-end.

What happened

The siege leg held: on 21 September the 72,825 dwt tanker LR Stephanie was struck in Hormuz, weekend transits fell to 17 ships and visible commodity traffic to 2 ships on 21 September. The Fed leg is not settled: on 17 September the dot plot's 2026 median rose to 4.00–4.25%, leaving the door to a further hike open, but no hike was made. Half the scenario has occurred; the other half stays open until year-end.

The published claim

S2 · 22% — Partial opening: the Iran–Oman corridor is applied, the blockade eases partly, the East–West line reopens within days.

What happened

The scenario is not dormant, but it did not happen. On 22 September Iran put on the table an offer to open Hormuz within seven days and the US and Iranian delegations met for three hours at the UN; the same day a parliamentary committee approved articles imposing a penalty of 20% of cargo value on ships in breach. There is an offer but no execution: the corridor was not applied and the blockade did not ease. The horizon has not passed.

The published claim

To watch: the gap between physical spot Brent and the futures contract. Futures rising while the gap stays open would mean the market has stopped treating the disruption as temporary.

What happened

The indicator moved, but not in the expected direction. The futures contract fell from $104.82 on 17 September to $100.05 on 22 September, meaning the market kept treating the disruption as temporary; the rise in futures the test was looking for did not happen. The other end of the gap could not be measured: FRED's Brent spot series is stuck at 15 September because of publication lag. Half the indicator could be read, half could not.

The published claim

Chip capacity is being placed by jurisdiction rather than by cost. This reading is disproved if second-stage chip tariffs are removed, export controls are mutually eased, or the Longtan expansion or the Dholera line is officially postponed.

What happened

No leg of the falsifier occurred; capacity went on being placed by jurisdiction. On 17 September Taiwan announced a 104-hectare expansion of the Longtan Science Park with NT$95.63bn of investment and 4,500 new jobs; the same day, at SEMICON India, a target of 50,000 wafers a month was announced for the Dholera line. No postponement. Nor was there mutual easing: on 20 September China's rare-earth magnet exports to the US were reported down 21% in August, to 512 tonnes. The reading stands.

The published claim

S1 · 50% — Allocation pressure persists: the struck primary distillation units do not return within weeks and Russia's export ban is extended on 31 October.

What happened

The strike leg was confirmed and then some: with the Kuybyshev and Ufa refineries hit on 22 September, more than 45% of Russian refining capacity was out of action. The units did not return within weeks; the loss widened instead. The ban leg cannot yet be checked: the extension decision falls on 31 October and that day has not come. One leg of the scenario is settled, the other is open.

The published claim

S2 · 30% — Repair and easing: refinery repairs advance, the tempo of strikes falls, and the ban lapses on 31 October without extension.

What happened

The condition this scenario rested on did not occur; the opposite did. We expected repairs to advance and the tempo of strikes to fall; on 20 September both crude distillation units at the Moscow Refinery burned and the plant halted, and that same night Russia said it had downed 1,110 drones. By 22 September capacity loss passed 45%. In five days the tempo did not fall, it escalated; this branch is closed.

The published claim

To watch: the repair timetable for the AVT-3 unit struck at YANOS; AVT-4 has been under repair since 28 August, and how fast the two units return will determine when allocation pressure eases.

What happened

No checkable data has come in. There is still no announced repair timetable for AVT-3, and nothing has been said about AVT-4's return. Meanwhile the question has partly lost its meaning: what matters is no longer how fast the two units return but how fast new strikes land.