| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Confirmed | The one thing to watch: the US 30-year auction at 21:00 on 12 November. An indirect bidder share below 70% would confirm that foreign demand is pulling back and that the term premium is widening independently of the Fed decision. |
| 11 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Partly borne out | Falsifier: an extension of the US–China suspensions to 12 months at APEC in Shenzhen, together with an indirect bidder share back above 70% at the 12 November 30-year auction, would refute the 'easing on lease' reading. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Partly borne out | H1 · 50% — Easing on lease continues: the suspensions are renewed for a short term, the Fed hikes by 25 basis points in December and Brent stays at 85–95 dollars. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Terms lengthen and easing becomes durable: the suspensions are extended to 12 months, foreign demand returns at the 30-year auction and Hormuz traffic exceeds half of pre-war levels. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Still open | H1 · 55% — Talks open, skies open: the Abu Dhabi round ends with a new schedule of talks but no ceasefire; strikes on the grid and bridges continue through the winter. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Falsified | H2 · 30% — A narrow infrastructure ceasefire: the sides agree a limited ceasefire, similar to the Oleshky model, covering energy facilities and possibly ports. |
| 9 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Second link: grid damage pushes Kyiv to prioritise a narrow energy and infrastructure ceasefire in Abu Dhabi and later rounds; Moscow tries to tie this to other concessions. |
| 9 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Third link: if an infrastructure ceasefire excludes ports, port strikes keep the insurance cost of Black Sea trade high; the indicators to watch are the war-risk premium and daily Bosphorus transits. |
| 9 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: January ICE Brent above 105 dollars would increase US pressure over strikes on Russian refineries and narrow Kyiv's logistical leverage. |
| 9 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Breaking condition: if the mid-November Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting yields new Patriot systems or interceptor deliveries, the interception rate rises and the chain breaks at the first step. |
| 9 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | Primary indicator: if US October CPI at 16:30 on 10 November beats the 0.3% monthly forecast, a December hike is locked in and the term premium reopens at that evening's $42 billion 10-year auction. |
| 9 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Falsified | The fastest channel to react to a hot US CPI will be emerging-market currencies and Türkiye's external financing costs. |
| 9 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | Secondary indicator: whether the 10–11 November Abu Dhabi round produces an energy infrastructure ceasefire clause will determine whether the Black Sea war premium drops out of its 0.6–1% band. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Prices ease, risk shifts to the public sector: Brent stays at $90–100 and Gulf political violence capacity is stuck at $200–400 million. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — The gap closes in price's favour: a Washington–Tehran framework reopens Hormuz, the tanker war premium falls below 2% and Brent drops below $90. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — The gap closes against price: an onshore Gulf facility is heavily damaged, or October CPI locks the Fed into a December hike and the dollar jumps; Brent tops $100 and CDS premiums widen. |
| 9 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier for the combined signal: an increase in war and political violence retrocession capacity at the 1 January 2027 renewal, or Gulf political violence capacity returning above $500 million, would falsify the reading. |
| 8 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Land crossings narrow, Iraqi volumes hold: Iraq closes several crossings, sanctions hit Caspian traffic and there is no major wave of attacks in Hormuz; Iraqi exports stay at 3–3.4 million barrels a day, but conditions harden. |
| 8 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — A Qatari formula loosens the blockade: the US accepts a step towards lifting the blockade, Iran grants IAEA access and opens Hormuz under an interim arrangement; benchmark oil falls below 90 dollars. |
| 8 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — Fighting resumes: the US restarts major operations before January and Iran retaliates against Gulf infrastructure; Basra loadings fall and benchmark oil rises above 110 dollars. |
| 8 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Thresholds: January Brent above 110 dollars means a fresh Gulf outage is being priced, below 90 dollars an easing of the blockade; daily Hormuz transits below 20 mean shipowners are pulling out of Basra. |
| 8 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Step 1 (weeks): Baghdad closes more crossings or tightens controls; Iran's western border trade is squeezed into a handful of points and tension rises with Iran-aligned Iraqi groups. |
| 8 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Step 2 (weeks): Tehran tightens control in Hormuz, incidents in the strait multiply and the Gulf war risk premium holds in the 6–10% band or rises; buyers ask Iraq for delivery outside the strait. |
| 8 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Still open | Step 3 (months): To protect revenue, Iraq leans on its own tankers and the Ceyhan line; Ceyhan loadings rise and Türkiye's transit income reflects the shift. |
| 8 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Breaking condition: if Qatari mediation secures an easing of the blockade and an interim reopening of Hormuz, pressure on the land crossings loses its point and the chain breaks at the first step. |
| 6 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Prices swing, buffers erode: Brent oscillates in a $90–105 band, the Gulf war premium stays at 6–10%, and the Yanbu outlet is threatened but stays open. |
| 6 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — A political framework replenishes buffers: the war premium falls below 2%, transits rise and Egypt recalls its deferred cargoes. |
| 6 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — Buffers break: the Yanbu outlet is hit or Türkiye's net reserves excluding swaps fall below $20 billion; Brent returns to its $113 peak. |
| 6 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Primary indicator: if CBRT weekly data on 12 November show net reserves excluding swaps falling from $24.3 billion to below $20 billion, the currency anchor's capacity to carry the energy bill reaches its limit. |
| 6 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Confluence falsifier: a rise in net reserves excluding swaps on 12 November, Egypt recalling its deferred cargoes and the Gulf war premium falling below 2% would disprove the reading. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Still open | H1 · 55% — Prices fall, the strait stays shut: Iran does not narrow its blacklist, daily transits stay at 3–7 ships, the war-risk premium holds in the 6–10% band, and part of the drop to 94.62 dollars is recovered within weeks. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Political framework, gradual reopening: the new balance in Washington speeds up framework talks with Iran, the blacklist narrows and transits with tracking signals on return to double digits. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — The list turns into seizures: Iran seizes one of the listed Gulf state tankers or stops vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers; January Brent returns above 100 dollars. |
| 5 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Primary indicator: if January Brent falls below 90 dollars while transits stay at 3–7 ships, the market is treating the constraint as overcome before we do. |
| 5 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Secondary indicator: the US affiliates rule and China's rare earth suspensions on 10 November; if no notice is published, access shifts from a contractual term to a formal restriction. |
| 5 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier for the converging-signals reading: the reading weakens if the US and Chinese suspensions are extended by notice on 10 November, if the ex-China price of yttrium halves by the end of December, or if daily transits with tracking signals on return to double digits in Hormuz. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — The dark corridor persists: the blockade and the PGSA list stay in place, transits with tracking signals on stay below 10 a day, and Gulf exports hold in the 15–18 million barrels a day band. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Deal and gradual reopening: the US and Iran reach an interim deal easing the blockade and sanctions, the PGSA list is suspended, and premiums fall with a lag as insurers wait for an incident-free period. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — The list cuts the transfer chain: the PGSA lists foreign tankers conducting transfers and seizes one, or an attack occurs; Gulf exports fall below 15 million barrels a day. |
| 5 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if January Brent falls below 90 dollars while the blacklist grows, futures prices have decoupled from the delivery constraint. |
| 5 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Step one (days): listed state fleets turn to transits with tracking signals off and to ship-to-ship transfers at sea. |
| 5 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Still open | Step two (weeks): the PGSA also lists foreign vessels taking over transfers, the war-risk premium does not fall below the 6–10% band, and the transfer link becomes more expensive. |
| 4 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Partly borne out | H1 · 55% — The window closes and the blockade holds: Qatar's 36-hour window lapses unanswered, tanker attacks continue, the war premium stays at 6–10% and January Brent recovers part of its two-session fall. |
| 4 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Falsified | H2 · 30% — Framework deal, delayed cover: the US and Iran reach a framework on the Qatari proposal and the strait reopens, but the Joint War Committee keeps its Gulf listing for weeks. |
| 4 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Falsified | H3 · 15% — The window closes in conflict: attacks extend beyond Qeshm, or the Habshan–Fujairah line and Red Sea facilities are hit, and cover is withdrawn under 7-day cancellation clauses. |
| 4 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Falsified | Primary indicator: if January Brent falls below $100 while the window lapses unanswered, the market has moved past the constraint before us; Brent at $103.60 does not translate into physical supply until the war premium drops below 2%. |
| 4 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Secondary indicator: if CBRT reserve data on 5 November show net reserves excluding swaps below $30 billion, room for a December rate cut narrows. |
| 4 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier for the confluence reading: if Swiss Re or Munich Re clearly expand cyber and trade credit capacity in their nine-month results, the case that non-transferable risk is staying on balance sheets weakens. |
| 4 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Partly borne out | H1 · 55% — Managed acceleration: Brent stays above $100, the CBRT holds monthly depreciation in a 1.8–2.0% band and reserves drain by $1–4 billion a week. |
| 4 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Energy relief: January Brent futures fall below $90, November energy imports drop markedly and the CBRT slows the monthly pace to 1.6%. |
| 4 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — Dollarisation wave: net reserves excluding swaps fall below $30 billion, the monthly pace exceeds 2% and resident demand for foreign currency rises. |
| 4 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Confirmed | Step 2: as financing needs are met from reserves, gross reserves keep falling and net reserves excluding swaps approach the $30 billion threshold (lag: days). |
| 4 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if Türkiye's 5-year CDS rises from 255.66 on 30 October to above 270, the market has started pricing the reserve drain into the risk premium. |
| 3 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | The secondary indicator is CBRT reserve data on 5 November: if net reserves excluding swaps fall below $30 billion, the 10 December rate cut narrows. |
| 3 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | The primary indicator is the Hormuz war premium and the pace of incidents. If January Brent closes below $100 for 5 sessions while the premium stays at 6–10%, the market is treating the constraint as overcome before we do. |
| 3 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Partly borne out | H1 · 55% — Plan on hold, gate shut: the US does not respond to the two-day plan and attacks keep their pace. The war premium stays at 6–10%, and January Brent recovers part of its 2 November drop. |
| 3 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — A deal, but cover lags: the US and Iran agree on the Qatari plan and the strait reopens, but the Joint War Committee keeps its Gulf listing for weeks. |
| 3 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — Escalation from the Qeshm line: attacks move beyond Qeshm, and the East–West pipeline or Red Sea facilities are hit again. |
| 3 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Suppose inventory sub-indices in the November PMIs for India and the euro area fall below 50, the US ISM prices component drops below 70 and Pakistan's wholesale inflation falls below 10%. Then the reading that costs are being deferred through inventories is refuted. |
| 3 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Partly borne out | H1 · 55% — Sizes fixed, language loosens: the $125 billion package is kept on 4 November, and the 'at least the next several quarters' wording is replaced with something more flexible. |
| 3 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Falsified | H2 · 30% — A signal of cuts at the far end: the Treasury indicates that 20- and 30-year auctions will shrink in 2027. |
| 3 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Falsified | H3 · 15% — Coupon increases come early: the Treasury brings forward language on increases in the 2–10 year sector to limit the bill share. |
| 3 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Thresholds: the 30-year above 5.40% and the 10-year above 5% would show that the coupon lock cannot protect the far end and that the term premium is widening again. |
| 3 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Still open | If the Fed hikes on 8–9 December, bill rates reprice within weeks; the interest bill rises without the lag that applies to debt at extended maturities. |
| 3 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Still open | If the 4 November statement keeps the $125 billion package, most of the first-quarter increase falls on bills and the bill share rises above 22%. |
| 31 October 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Partly borne out | H1 · 50% — Scarcity stays at the front of the curve: Iran gives a partial response, the decision slips past 3 November and OPEC+ keeps its targets on 1 November. |
| 31 October 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Falsified | The claim we flagged as noise: Brent's fall from 117.64 to 113.43 dollars does not show the risk premium melting; scarcity has moved to the January contract. |
| 31 October 2026 | Scenario | %35 | Still open | H2 · 35% — Strike and Gulf retaliation: a US strike begins after 3 November, or limpet and Houthi attacks turn into verified damage at a facility. |
| 31 October 2026 | Causal chain | — | Still open | Breaking condition for the chain: Kpler flows return above 11 million barrels a day, the January–February spread falls below 1 dollar, or Iran responds positively to the Qatari draft. |
| 30 October 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | The primary indicator is the first independently verified damage to the state-linked fleet in the southern Hormuz corridor. If verified, the last carrier filling the space insurance has vacated comes under risk too; if not, the mine claim remains a tool for raising costs. |
| 30 October 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | The secondary indicator is the January–February Brent spread after the 30 October expiry: if it stays above $3, scarcity persists at the front of the curve. |
| 30 October 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Partly borne out | H1 · 55% — Balance sheets carry the load, supply continues: the state-linked fleet keeps loading without verified damage, the January–February spread stays above $3, and risk accumulates on state and corporate balance sheets. |
| 30 October 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — The last carrier is hit too: independently verified mine or attack damage to a state fleet tanker in the southern corridor; scarcity spreads across the whole curve. |
| 30 October 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — The cover door opens: Iran's 7-day plan is tied to a ceasefire and the marine war premium in Hormuz begins to fall back towards pre-war levels. |
| 30 October 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | If a major exchange reopens service to Russian users by the end of November, or Yandex restores its guidance unchanged, the reading that digital payment and data infrastructure around Russia is narrowing weakens. |
| 30 October 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | If war and cyber cover narrows at the January renewal while overall prices fall, the transfer of risk onto balance sheets accelerates; the cover threshold is what to watch. |
| 30 October 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Confirmed | Calendar item: no change to December production targets is expected at the 1 November OPEC+ meeting; the real question is the capacity of the fleet carrying Gulf exports. |
| 29 October 2026 | Causal chain | — | Falsified | The first step of the chain rested on the 10-year Treasury yield staying above 5%. Breaking condition: oil retreats markedly or the data weaken, pulling the 10-year below 5%. |
| 29 October 2026 | Scenario | %45 | Still open | H1 · 45% — The Fed hikes in December, the BoC holds: the Fed moves to 4.00–4.25% on 9 December, while the Bank of Canada holds the same day, citing the slowdown. |
| 29 October 2026 | Scenario | %25 | Still open | H3 · 25% — The Fed holds again: PCE and payrolls data weaken or oil retreats markedly, and the Fed leaves rates unchanged in December too. |