HighI Geo-Economics & Chokepoints15 November 2026, Sunday
Yemeni government forces quit Bab el-Mandeb, ceding the coast to the Houthis
Southern forces loyal to Yemen's recognised government announced on 15 November that they had withdrawn from Dhubab and the Bab el-Mandeb area. They cited the need to defend Aden; positions overlooking the strait's southern entrance are now within reach of the Iran-backed Houthis.
According to The National, government troops said in October that they had retaken Dhubab and the port city of Mocha. The Houthis had pushed down to the Red Sea coast and reached the strait in September. The southern forces said the 15 November withdrawal was meant to protect Aden and the surrounding provinces and, with backing from the Saudi-led coalition, to break the siege of Taiz. Of the roughly 300,000 people displaced across Yemen in the latest fighting, half are sheltering in Taiz.
The constraint lies in the route itself. The Maritime Executive's analysis of 15 November notes that the Ras Menheli peninsula and Perim Island dominate the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Who held Perim as of 15 November is unclear in the sources and could not be verified. The Houthis have not cut general traffic in recent weeks; they say they will target only Saudi- and Israel-linked ships. The US, the EU and the major lines have accepted that assurance, and container lines have returned to the Red Sea.
Control of the coast could change the nature of attacks. The same analysis argues that a force holding Perim could reach ships not only with drones and missiles but also by boarding from armed speedboats. The author suggests that the cash-strapped Houthis might demand transit fees, citing Suez tolls as a model. As of 15 November the EU's Aspides operation provides only occasional escorts. According to The National, the Houthis struck Saudi ports, airports and Aramco facilities in 2026, including the Yanbu export hub.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The withdrawal brings the southern entrance of Bab el-Mandeb back within Houthi range. For now the Houthis say they target only Saudi- and Israel-linked ships, and the container lines' return to the Red Sea rests on that promise. The most likely path is that general traffic continues while Saudi-linked cargo and the risk of transit fees are repriced.
Likely effects
- Red Sea container trafficNegativeWeeks
The lines tied their return to the Houthis' promise of selective targeting; control of the coast turns that promise into a unilateral and revocable assurance.
- Saudi exportsNegative1–6 months
The Yanbu outlet that bypasses Hormuz is already a Houthi target; with the strait's coast also passing to the Houthis, Saudi cargo on the Red Sea route is squeezed at two points.
- TürkiyeNegative1–6 months
Route risk is rising again for Turkish exporters and importers using the Suez and Red Sea route; a return to the Cape of Good Hope would lengthen delivery times.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Selective targeting continues55%
The Houthis leave general traffic alone and target only Saudi- and Israel-linked ships.
Watch: JMIC and UKMTO Red Sea advisories and the major lines' Suez service announcements
- 2Transit fees or boardings25%
The Houthis stop ships from Perim with speedboats or demand fees, and the lines divert to the Cape of Good Hope again.
Watch: Statements from the Houthi HOCC and daily Bab el-Mandeb transit counts (PortWatch)
- 3Government forces return20%
A Saudi-backed counter-offensive retakes Dhubab and the coast is contested again.
Watch: Military statements from the Dhubab and Suqiya front
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Market reaction
Indicators affected
- Displaced (latest fighting)▼ ~300,000 people