
IV Macro Policy & Sovereign DebtAmericas
FGV traces Brazil's excess real rates to debt structure, not fiscal policy
- Institution
- FGV IBRE — Brazilian Institute of Economics (Blog do IBRE)
- Author
- Bráulio Borges
- Country · language
- Brazil · Portuguese
- Affiliation
- Economics institute, private foundation
Summary
On 17 November, writing on the FGV IBRE blog, Bráulio Borges took a fresh measure of Brazil's high real interest rate. His earlier piece had compared Brazil with South Africa; this time he added Mexico. He compared the three countries over 2000–2025 using 17 indicators covering debt, savings, the external balance, credit and monetary institutions. Borges stripped out the US real rate and the EMBI+ risk premium. Even so, Brazil's real rate stays 2–4 points above its two peers.
In Borges's view, fiscal impulse explains swings in the gap but not its level. With zero fiscal impulse, the estimated gap is 3.4 points for Brazil, 1.1 for Mexico and 0.2 for South Africa. Excluding 2020 and 2021, the annual averages are 3.5, 1.1 and −0.2 points. Over 2023–2025 Brazil's gap widened to 4.2 points. In the same period Mexico's gap was 1.8 points and South Africa's −2.0. Mexico's gap hovered around zero in 2015–2017 and climbed to 2.8 points in 2021–2023.
The author does not find Brazil an outlier on debt size, domestic savings, reserves or central bank independence. He sees the divergence in four features. About half of domestic public debt is indexed to the Selic. The foreign share of real-denominated debt is low. Bank lending spreads are a notch above those of peers. More than 40% of the credit stock is directed lending. These four features match the level differences between countries, but not changes over time within a country. Borges therefore sees a persistent equilibrium that no single measure can easily break.
Blind spot
The piece builds its case on correlation. It does not decompose how much each of the four features contributes to the gap. It does not say which mix of reforms could shift the equilibrium. It does not address the central bank's current Selic cycle or the post-election fiscal debate. Nor does it fully explain why 2020 and 2021 were excluded.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
Borges's reading moves Brazil's interest rate debate away from fiscal packages towards the structure of the debt and credit markets. Fiscal discipline can dampen swings in the gap but cannot by itself close a level difference of 2–4 points. Because the structural features change slowly, the most likely path is that Brazil keeps living with real rates high relative to its peers.
Likely effects
- Sovereign debtNegative1–6 months
With about half of domestic debt indexed to the Selic, rate hikes pass quickly into debt costs. Monetary policy puts a direct burden on public finances.
- CreditNegative1–6 months
If more than 40% of the credit stock is directed lending, market rates operate on a narrow base. The burden falls on firms and households that depend on free-market credit.
- Emerging marketsUncertain6 months+
The analysis shows that high real rates can stem from debt indexation and directed credit as well as fiscal laxity. That calls for a look at structural features in high-real-rate countries, Türkiye included.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Persistently wide gap55%
Even if fiscal discipline strengthens, the Selic-indexed share of debt and directed lending stay in place. The gap remains in the 2–4 point band.
Watch: The Selic-indexed share of domestic debt in Treasury debt reports
- 2Gradual narrowing30%
The Treasury shifts towards fixed-rate debt and the share of directed lending declines. The gap narrows over several years.
Watch: A lasting rise in foreigners' share of real-denominated government debt
- 3Gap widens15%
Fiscal impulse increases and the 2023–2025 average of 4.2 points is exceeded.
Watch: Deterioration in the cyclically adjusted primary balance and a jump in the EMBI+ premium
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: blogdoibre.fgv.br · 17 November 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.