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Aerial panorama of the Singapore Strait and the Pasir Panjang container terminal

III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceAsia-Pacific

From Tokyo, old destroyers handed to Manila do not deliver deterrence alone

Singapore Strait and Pasir Panjang Port Terminal (2016)Photo: Bob Tan / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Author
Hironobu Takezawa
Country · language
Japan · English
Affiliation
Foreign ministry-linked institute

Summary

A report by JIIA researcher Hironobu Takezawa, published on 14 October, examines Japan's transfer of Abukuma-class destroyers to the Philippines. On 21 April 2026 Japan revised its principles on defence equipment exports. It scrapped the five permitted categories of rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping; any type of equipment can now be transferred subject to review. On 7 July Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro announced agreement in principle on the transfer of five destroyers. The ships are to be delivered within 2–3 years of decommissioning. On 28 May the two countries raised ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the first of its kind for the Philippines.

Takezawa writes that the transfer coincides with the Philippines' shift from fighting domestic insurgency to external defence. In his account, the Philippine navy's main surface force amounts to three old Hamilton-class cutters and four new South Korean-built frigates. Five destroyers could close the gap in patrol, surveillance and response to grey-zone activity, meaning coercion below the threshold of war. Japan's anti-submarine experience can be passed on through training and exercises. Manila is pursuing its Re-Horizon 3 plan, which envisages procurement of roughly 35 billion dollars over ten years.

The author also sets out the risks. The Abukuma class was built for coastal duties, has limited air defence and has served for more than 30 years; it is weaker than the new frigates. Between 2014 and 2020 the armed forces received only about 40% of planned funding, and fewer than 30% of projects were completed. Takezawa argues that an equipment transfer works only according to the recipient's dependence, alternative suppliers and operational integration. The Philippines is diversifying its suppliers across the US, South Korea and Israel.

Blind spot

Published on 14 October, the report reflects events only up to 26 August; seven weeks of South China Sea incidents, and the destroyers' price, are missing. It reads the transfer as a way to balance China but ignores Beijing's possible countermoves, such as economic pressure on Manila. It skims over the risk of a reversal after the 2028 Philippine election. Japan's own industrial interest, with second-hand transfers opening the way to new ship sales, is presented as objective analysis.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The report shows that the Philippines is the first concrete test of Tokyo's lifting of arms export restrictions, and that Japanese think tanks read it with caution. Five old destroyers close a capability gap but do not create deterrence on their own; maintenance, training and budget are decisive. Funding delivery of 40% in 2014–2020 says Manila's capacity to execute is the real constraint. The most likely path is a transfer that stays on schedule but shows its effect slowly.

Likely effects

  • South China SeaUncertain6 months+

    Five destroyers raise the Philippines' patrol and surveillance capacity against grey-zone pressure; limited air defence reduces their value in direct conflict.

  • Japanese defence exportsPositive6 months+

    The 21 April rule change and the Philippine transfer position Japan as a regional supplier of second-hand and, later, new ships.

  • China–Japan relationsNegative1–6 months

    The handover of Japanese destroyers to the Philippines could harden Beijing's objections to Tokyo's military role in the region.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    The transfer stays on schedule55%

    A formal transfer agreement is signed, and the 2–3-year timetable runs once the first ship is decommissioned.

    Watch: Signature of a formal agreement between Japan and the Philippines on the Abukuma transfer

  2. 2
    Budget and maintenance delays30%

    The Philippine budget and maintenance infrastructure fall behind, and delivery and commissioning slip.

    Watch: A cut in the share of the Philippines' 2027 defence budget set aside for ship maintenance and training

  3. 3
    The scope widens15%

    The transfer grows into a purchase of new ships or a co-production agreement.

    Watch: Manila announcing a new ship order from a Japanese shipyard or a co-production deal

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: jiia.or.jp · 14 October 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.