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IV Macro Policy & Sovereign DebtAmericas

Rabat institute says fiscal policy is Lula's fourth-term test

The White House, north façade, Washington (July 2007)Photo: Nishkid64 / Wikimedia Commons · Public domain · Source
Institution
Policy Center for the New South (Rabat)
Author
Otaviano Canuto
Country · language
Morocco · English
Affiliation
Independent think tank

Summary

On 9 November Otaviano Canuto of the Policy Center for the New South wrote about Brazil's post-election market shock. On Monday 26 October the dollar rose 8.21% against the real to close at 5.40 reais and stayed there all week. By Thursday the Ibovespa had fallen about 18.4% from its level before the run-off. Long-term rates and sovereign risk premiums rose. Canuto reads this as an overreaction in asset prices, triggered by the perception that the debt ratio will keep rising.

In the author's view, the fiscal framework of Lula's third term failed to halt the deterioration. Federal non-interest spending rose from 17.8% of GDP in 2021–22 to 19.6% in 2023 and stayed high for the next two years. Gross public debt, 72% of GDP at end-2022, is expected to approach 83% in 2026. According to Solange Srour and UBS, stabilising the debt requires an adjustment of about 4% of GDP. Two IIF economists recommend improving the primary balance by at least 0.5 points a year.

Canuto sets out three paths. Denial raises the risk of a hard landing, while Milei-style abrupt cuts could crush growth and trigger widespread defaults. In his view the only workable route is gradual adjustment. Congressional earmarks, judicial privileges and the indexation of social programmes should be reviewed. In 2002 Lula raised the primary surplus target from 3.75% to 4.25%, the risk premium fell and Brazil won an investment-grade rating.

Blind spot

The piece debates the pace of adjustment but gives no figure for how much high global rates add to Brazil's borrowing costs. It never mentions the central bank's policy rate. It also leaves unclear which spending items the balance of power in Congress would allow to be cut; the proposals are not tested for political feasibility.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

In Canuto's reading, Brazil's problem is not the election result but the self-feeding dynamic of a debt ratio approaching 83%. As the risk premium rises, so do rates, and as rates rise, so does debt. Markets will look for a credible fiscal signal in the first months of the new term. The most likely path is that a partial, gradual adjustment package calms markets only partly.

Likely effects

  • Brazilian realNegativeWeeks

    After the 8.21% jump on 26 October, a delayed fiscal signal would keep the real under pressure around 5.40 and push up imported inflation.

  • Sovereign debtNegative1–6 months

    With the debt ratio nearing 83%, a high risk premium keeps extended-maturity yields elevated and raises the cost of rolling over debt.

  • Emerging marketsUncertain1–6 months

    Fiscal concern in Brazil could lead investors to scrutinise fiscal policy more harshly in other emerging economies with rising debt ratios; Türkiye remains part of that comparison.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Partial, gradual adjustment50%

    The government announces a package capping spending growth; the risk premium eases but does not return to pre-election levels.

    Watch: The primary balance target in the new term's first budget and the finance ministry's spending ceiling announcement

  2. 2
    Denial persists30%

    The administration argues no adjustment is needed, and pressure on the real and extended-maturity yields deepens.

    Watch: The dollar settling above 5.40 reais and a new high in extended-maturity government bond yields

  3. 3
    Strong fiscal anchor20%

    As in 2002, Lula raises the primary surplus target with a clear commitment and the risk premium falls quickly.

    Watch: An official commitment moving the primary surplus target towards 2% of GDP

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: policycenter.ma · 9 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.