From a Moscow platform, sanctions block the Northern Sea Route more than ice

Summary

In a piece published by the Valdai Club on 15 October, Kim Seung Rae of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies examines South Korea's 2026 Northern Sea Route pilot voyage. The 2,758-TEU Panstar Acro left Busan on 22 August and crossed the Arctic between 31 August and 9 September. It called at Felixstowe, Rotterdam and Gdańsk and returned to Busan on 5 October. The ship carried only 737 TEU of actual cargo; utilisation stayed at 30%, well below the initial 1,300-TEU target. According to the author, shippers were deterred by freezing, insurance delays after iceberg strikes and weather uncertainty.

Kim accepts the route's advantage on paper. The distance via the Arctic is about 14,000 km against 22,000 km via Suez, cutting a one-way voyage by more than ten days. He then lists the commercial constraints. Safe container shipping is possible for only 3–4 months a year, ice-class ships cost 50–100% more than ordinary vessels and Russian icebreaker escort fees wipe out the fuel savings. In his view, the route is not a regular liner service but could serve as a back-up corridor during blockages such as those at Suez.

Sanctions are the piece's centre of gravity. Russia treats the route as internal waters, and permits are issued only by Rosatomflot, a Rosatom subsidiary that the US and EU have placed on sanctions lists. The 2026 voyage avoided sanctions exposure because it paid no service fees, but regular sailings will require icebreaker payments. Kim writes that indirect payments carry the risk of secondary sanctions and exclusion from SWIFT. Sanctions clauses at London-based insurance clubs could also void cover. He proposes up to 11 billion won in shipbuilding support and a multilateral payment infrastructure for a regular service by 2030.