Skip to content
Flames fed by gas seeping from the ground at Baba Gurgur in the Kirkuk oilfield, with a military vehicle and soldiers on the ridge behind

VI Energy Politics & Supply Security·Analysis·Türkiye and Its Neighbourhood

Kirkuk reopens, but Iraq's spare barrels cap the overland route

On 17 November Iraq began pumping 120,000 barrels a day to Ceyhan through a federal pipeline shut since 2014. The target is 500,000 barrels. But Iraq produced 4.6 million barrels a day in October, leaving only 270,000 barrels of sustainable capacity.

Türkiye & Neighbourhood Desk · 18 November 2026 · 8 min read · 16 sources

Talay Insight Analysis DeskAI-assisted analysis, reviewed by an editorPublisher of record: Lu Apps LLCTrack recordRequest a correction

The eternal fire of Baba Gurgur in the Kirkuk field, 11 March 2005 — archive photo, illustrativePhoto: Chad.r.hill / Wikimedia Commons · Public domain · Source

Why it matters

Noise: the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has reopened after a decade, and the overland route is replacing Hormuz. Signal: the ceiling in the north is set by Iraq's spare barrels, not by the pipe. The IEA says Iraq produced 4.6 million barrels a day in October against capacity of 4.87 million. That 270,000-barrel gap is smaller than the federal line's targeted increase of 380,000 barrels. Every new barrel heading north is most likely diverted from Basra. For Türkiye transit revenue is not the main channel; even at 750,000 barrels a year's income is roughly 5% of a single month's energy bill.

Implications

  • According to Reuters, the 960-kilometre federal pipeline reopened on 17 November at 120,000 barrels a day. The target is 500,000 barrels; the minimum flow in the 1 August agreement is 750,000.
  • The IEA's November report shows Iraq produced 4.6 million barrels a day in October, against an OPEC+ target of 4.43 million and sustainable capacity of 4.87 million. Spare capacity is 270,000 barrels and the quota overshoot 170,000.
  • SOMO puts the transit fee at 1.62 dollars a barrel. By Talay's calculation, annual revenue at 750,000 barrels a day is about 443.5 million dollars; Türkiye's energy bill for October alone was 8.3 billion dollars.

Noise

The Kirkuk pipeline has reopened after a decade, and the overland route is replacing Hormuz

Signal

Iraq's spare barrels, not the pipe, set the ceiling in the north

Signal vs Noise ›

Map: Kirkuk reopens, but Iraq's spare barrels cap the overland route

The noise is in the pipeline; the signal is at the wellhead

The headline fits in one sentence: Iraq has reopened a federal pipeline shut for more than a decade. Oil Minister Basim Mohammed Khudair announced on 17 November that pumping had begun at 120,000 barrels a day, with a target of 500,000. According to Daily Sabah, the minister said the northern route allows oil to be marketed without discounts. The same day an LPG tanker was struck for a second time in the Strait of Hormuz. Readers who set the two stories side by side conclude that the overland route has replaced the strait.

Talay reads it differently. The question for Pillar VI is the threshold beyond which flows stop. On this line that threshold is not the diameter of the pipe. Capacity is 1.2 million barrels a day according to The National and 1.4 million according to Energy Minister Bayraktar. Current flows are not even close to half of that. The binding constraint sits in three places: Iraq's spare barrels, storage turnover at Ceyhan, and the political split between Baghdad and Erbil.

1 · Spare barrels of 270,000 against a targeted increase of 380,000

The IEA's 13 November report puts a number on the constraint. Iraq's crude supply rose from 4.06 million to 4.6 million barrels a day in October. Sustainable capacity is 4.87 million. That leaves 270,000 barrels in the ground. Lifting the federal line from 120,000 to 500,000 barrels requires an extra 380,000. By Talay's calculation, at least 110,000 barrels of the target must come from another route rather than from spare capacity.

That route is Basra. A North Oil Company source quoted by Kurdistan 24 on 2 November said roughly 200,000 of the 500,000 barrels reaching Ceyhan were Basra crude already trucked north. Kirkuk's share was 125,000 barrels and Kurdistan's 175,000–200,000. No official has confirmed these figures. Nor has anyone said how much of the 120,000 barrels on the federal line is new output and how much is Kirkuk oil shifted off the Kurdistan pipeline.

The quota is a second wall. The IEA says Iraq exceeded its OPEC+ target by 170,000 barrels a day in October. New output in the north would widen the overshoot. Diversion protects the quota but does not raise Iraq's total exports. Reuters' assessment lands in the same place: the net effect depends on whether the volumes add to existing shipments. Talay therefore reads the federal line as a backup route, not as additional supply.

2 · Tank turnover at Ceyhan and the political split

The pipe ends at Ceyhan, and that is where the constraint begins. Pipeline & Gas Journal puts BOTAŞ's crude storage capacity at Ceyhan at 11.1 million barrels. The expansion does not come online before 2028. By Talay's calculation, inflows of 750,000 barrels a day would fill those tanks in about 15 days without loadings. According to Iraq Oil Report, the Valpiave, which sailed from Ceyhan on 3 August, carried just over 600,000 barrels. At that cargo size, 750,000 barrels a day means about 37 loadings a month.

The constraint is not theoretical. Shafaq reports that Kurdistan flows stopped on 3 October 2025. A North Oil Company source blamed full tanks at Ceyhan; the ministry cited a technical fault. In November 2025 Kurdistan's natural resources minister said exports fluctuate daily with available tank space at Ceyhan. The same tanks also feed Tüpraş; on 3 August SOMO sent 250,000 barrels from storage to Tüpraş.

The political split is fragile too. Roughly half of Ceyhan's flow comes through the Kurdistan pipeline. According to The National, those flows stopped in March 2026; Baghdad blamed Erbil, and Erbil blamed militia attacks. Erbil also claimed Baghdad had imposed an embargo since January on customs-system grounds. The federal line reduces that dependence. But without both lines running, flows cannot reach the 750,000-barrel threshold.

3 · For Türkiye, transit is small and price is large

SOMO director general Ali Nizar al-Shatari says the new agreement sets the transit fee at 1.62 dollars a barrel. The fee covers BOTAŞ's operating and maintenance costs. By Talay's calculation, annual revenue is about 71 million dollars at 120,000 barrels a day and 443.5 million at 750,000. According to Bloomberg HT, Türkiye imported 8.3 billion dollars of energy in October alone, up 71.7% year on year. Even at full capacity, transit revenue equals roughly 5% of a single month's bill.

The arbitration burden should be read at the same scale. According to Hydrocarbon Processing, the Paris arbitration ruled that Türkiye owes Iraq a net 1.5 billion dollars. That equals roughly 3.4 years of transit revenue at 750,000 barrels a day (Talay calculation). Bayraktar has framed the arbitration as part of negotiations on a multi-year pipeline deal. The interim agreement expires in August 2027.

For Türkiye the real channel is price and proximity of supply. EPDK's August report shows Iraq was the second-largest oil supplier after Russia, at 553,812 tonnes. The northern route insulates those barrels from Hormuz risk. Brent futures closed at 93.50 dollars on 17 November; the CBRT's 2027 assumption, raised on 12 November, is 86.7 dollars. The northern line cannot close that 6.8-dollar gap. Interest expenditure in the October budget rose 91.4% year on year, and energy prices feed into that interest bill through inflation.

4 · Threshold, second-round effects and falsifier

The chain runs through three links. As the federal line ramps up, northern volumes are diverted from Basra, and Iraq's total exports stay around 3.4 million barrels a day. As northern flows approach 750,000 barrels, Ceyhan's tank turnover becomes binding. At that point a fresh disruption in Hormuz cannot be shifted north and passes straight into Brent. Türkiye pays for it not through transit but through its energy bill and the CBRT's oil assumption.

Talay assigns this reading a 50% probability. The falsifier is concrete. If the Iraqi Oil Ministry's November data show total exports well above 3.4 million barrels a day, northern volumes are additional rather than diverted. If the IEA's December report raises Iraq's sustainable capacity above 4.87 million, the spare-barrel constraint eases. If no storage-related flow interruption is reported at Ceyhan for three months, the tank-turnover threshold is wider than we expect.

We also state the limits. No official source has verified the 500,000-barrel total flow to Ceyhan. Iraqi authorities have not disclosed the federal line's pumping-station capacity or its repair schedule. Sources conflict on whether 750,000 barrels is a minimum or a maximum.

Probabilities

Scenarios

ScenarioProbabilityTriggerMarket impact
H1The north grows, the total holds50%The federal line ramps to 300,000–500,000 barrels a day, but volumes are diverted from Basra and the Kurdistan pipeline; Iraq's total exports stay around 3.4 million barrels.Ceyhan approaches the 750,000-barrel threshold without Iraqi supply growing; the north becomes a backup to Hormuz, not a substitute.
H2The north stalls30%Pumping stations, tank turnover or the Baghdad–Erbil dispute keep Ceyhan flows below 500,000 barrels a day.The federal line fills the gap left by the Kurdistan pipeline but does not grow the total; the 750,000-barrel commitment stays out of reach until August 2027.
H3Hormuz shuts and the north hits its ceiling20%Tanker attacks off Oman and the Bahrain front escalate, and Basra loadings fall markedly.The north is pushed to exceed 750,000 barrels, but spare barrels and 11.1 million barrels of storage cap the flow; the shortfall passes into price.

Module A

Constraints Matrix

STRUCTURAL AVG 3.8 · TACTICAL AVG 3.0Structural constraints dominate: the outcome is set more by these limits than by the actors' preferences.

Hard structural constraintspersistent · beyond the actors' will

  • Iraq's spare barrels

    5/5

    The IEA says Iraq produced 4.6 million barrels a day in October against sustainable capacity of 4.87 million. The 270,000-barrel margin is smaller than the federal line's targeted increase of 380,000.

  • Ceyhan storage capacity · Türkiye

    4/5

    BOTAŞ's crude storage at Ceyhan is 11.1 million barrels; the first six tanks of the expansion come online in 2028. At 750,000 barrels a day the tanks fill in about 15 days without loadings.

  • The OPEC+ quota

    3/5

    Iraq exceeded its target by 170,000 barrels a day in October. New output in the north widens the overshoot; diversion protects the quota but does not raise total exports.

  • Arbitration debt and deal expiry · Türkiye

    3/5

    The Paris arbitration ruled that Türkiye owes Iraq a net 1.5 billion dollars; the 1 August interim agreement expires in August 2027.

Tactical frictiontemporary · eases over time

  • The Baghdad–Erbil split weeks

    4/5

    Roughly half of Ceyhan's flow comes through the Kurdistan pipeline. Those flows stopped in March 2026; Baghdad blamed Erbil, and Erbil blamed militia attacks.

  • Loading tempo days

    3/5

    With 600,000-barrel cargoes, 750,000 barrels a day means about 37 loadings a month; in October 2025 flows stopped once the tanks were full.

  • Trucked Basra crude weeks

    3/5

    Kurdistan 24 says roughly 200,000 of the 500,000 barrels at Ceyhan are Basra oil trucked north; that volume is not permanent pipeline capacity.

  • Missing official data weeks

    2/5

    No official source has verified the 500,000-barrel total flow or the federal line's pumping-station capacity; the threshold calculation relies on news sources.

Module B

Signal vs Noise

SIGNAL 71% · NOISE 29%

Module C

Asset-Class and Positioning Implications

Asset classExposureTransmission channelH1H2H3ExpectedConvictionHorizonWhat to watch
CommoditiesBrent prompt curveBecause the northern route does not add to total supply, a Hormuz disruption passes directly into price−0++−0.10●●●0–3 monthsThe 100-dollar and 86.7-dollar thresholds on Brent futures
CommoditiesMedium-heavy crude differentials delivered to the MediterraneanMore Iraqi barrels at Ceyhan increase sour crude supply in the Mediterranean−++0.00●●●3–12 monthsSOMO's monthly Ceyhan sales volume
Freight & insuranceEastern Mediterranean mid-size tanker freight750,000 barrels a day requires about 37 loadings a month, lifting demand for tonnage out of Ceyhan+−+++0.60●●●0–3 monthsMonthly Ceyhan loadings and reports of storage-related interruptions
FXTurkish liraThe energy bill passes into the current account and the currency; transit revenue does not offset it00−−−0.40●●●3–12 monthsThe 8 billion-dollar threshold for energy imports in November trade data
Sovereign debtTürkiye dollar-denominated sovereign debtIf the oil assumption is overshot, the inflation forecast and the interest burden rise00−−0.20●●●3–12 monthsTürkiye 5-year CDS and Brent's distance from 86.7 dollars
Sovereign debtIraq dollar-denominated sovereign debtRoughly 90% of budget revenue depends on oil; the northern route partly reduces Hormuz risk+−−−−0.20●●●3–12 monthsThe Iraqi Oil Ministry's monthly export data and Basra loadings
EquitiesTurkish refining sectorIraqi barrels arrive by pipeline from Ceyhan storage, insulating supply from Hormuz risk+0−+0.30●●●3–12 monthsCrude imports from Iraq in EPDK's monthly report

How to read: ++ strong structural support · + support · 0 neutral · − pressure · −− strong pressure. “Expected” is the direction weighted by scenario probabilities. H1: The north grows, the total holds · H2: The north stalls · H3: Hormuz shuts and the north hits its ceiling.

General, scenario-conditional analysis at asset-class level. It contains no specific security, price target or trade timing and is not personalised investment advice (Turkish Capital Markets Law No. 6362).

Second-order effects

And then what?

Starting point

On 17 November Iraq reopened the federal Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline at 120,000 barrels a day, with a target of 500,000. The IEA says Iraq produced 4.6 million barrels a day in October, leaving only 270,000 barrels of sustainable capacity.

  1. 1

    Iraq's export routingwithin weeks

    As the federal line ramps up, most northern volumes are diverted from Basra and the Kurdistan pipeline. Iraq's total exports stay around 3.4 million barrels a day; Ceyhan's share grows but total supply does not.

    Watch: The Iraqi Oil Ministry's November and December export data; Iraqi supply and capacity in the IEA's December report

  2. 2

    Ceyhan storage and loadingswithin weeks

    As northern flows approach 750,000 barrels a day, BOTAŞ's 11.1 million barrels of tankage becomes binding. Unless loadings rise to about 37 cargoes a month, flows are cut because storage is full.

    Watch: SOMO's monthly Ceyhan sales (7 million barrels in July) and reports of storage-related flow interruptions

  3. 3

    Energy bill and inflationwithin months

    Once the north hits its ceiling, a fresh Hormuz disruption cannot be shifted to the overland route and passes into Brent. Türkiye pays not through transit revenue but through its energy bill and the CBRT's 86.7-dollar oil assumption.

    Watch: Energy imports in November and December trade data (8.3 billion dollars in October) and Brent's distance from 86.7 dollars

What breaks the chain

If Iraq brings new production online and lifts sustainable capacity well above 4.87 million barrels a day, northern volumes become additional rather than diverted. If a deal with Iran normalises Hormuz, the north's importance falls to that of a backup route.

Triggers

Thresholds to watch

IndicatorThresholdTodayWhat it means
Brent crude oil (futures)> 100—If Brent rises from 93.50 dollars on 17 November above 100 dollars, the northern route cannot absorb a Hormuz disruption; Türkiye's monthly energy bill stays above 8.3 billion dollars
Brent crude oil (futures)< 86.7—If Brent falls below the CBRT's 2027 assumption, the energy channel stops pressuring the inflation forecast; the northern line's importance for Türkiye shrinks to supply proximity

Sources

  1. Asharq Al-Awsat — Iraq resumes crude oil pumping for export purposes via pipeline to Türkiye
  2. Daily Sabah — Iraq resumes oil pumping for export purposes via pipeline to Türkiye
  3. IEA — Oil Market Report, November 2026
  4. Kurdistan 24 — Iraq's Ceyhan oil exports hit 500,000 barrels
  5. Pipeline & Gas Journal — Turkey's BOTAS to quadruple Ceyhan crude storage capacity
  6. Hydrocarbon Processing — Turkey says Iraq seeks 750,000 bpd capacity on Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline
  7. Zawya (Reuters) — Iraq's SOMO sells about 42 mln barrels of oil in July, director general says
  8. Gulf News — Iraq, Turkey agree one-year oil pipeline deal targeting 750,000 barrels a day
  9. Iraq Oil Report — Turkey pipeline deal sets challenging target for Iraqi oil exports
  10. Shafaq News — Kurdistan oil exports stopped as Ceyhan hits capacity
  11. Rudaw — Iraqi official says Kurdistan Region's daily oil exports total 200k barrels
  12. The National — Kurdistan government disputes claim it halted Iraqi oil exports
  13. Bloomberg HT — Minister Bolat: October exports exceeded 25.9 billion dollars
  14. CNBC-e — Türkiye's oil imports top 4.5 million tonnes in August
  15. Bigpara — CBRT Governor Fatih Karahan presents the year's final Inflation Report
  16. Investing.com — Brent Oil Futures Historical Data
Share

Sourcing and verification rules: methodology · Report an error: contact

Related reports