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HighII Cyber Warfare & Critical Infrastructure12 November 2026, Thursday

SilentAir spied on Taiwanese subscribers through Asian carriers' equipment

In a report published on 11 November and updated on 12 November, Swedish telecoms security firm Enea said a group it calls SilentAir had compromised operator equipment in at least 6 Asian countries. The main targets are subscribers in Taiwan, among them politicians and government officials.

Location: TAIPEI

According to Enea, the group sends spoofed SS7 and Diameter signals into IPX, the interconnect network operators rely on to trust one another. These signals make a subscriber's phone appear attached to the compromised equipment and divert both calls and text messages to the attacker. According to The Hacker News on 13 November, two-factor authentication codes were intercepted immediately after redirection in some cases.

Enea measured interception at 18.3% of SilentAir's activity; for a typical surveillance company the figure is 2.07%. In its 11 November report Enea assesses with high confidence that the group is a state-level actor, and with low confidence that it is linked to China. Its activity follows UTC+8 working hours and it does not target Chinese networks.

According to the report, a separate group, LIMINAL PANDA, has penetrated at least 5 to 10 operators. Enea writes that access to one of more than 800 operators gives access to the others through IPX. The company has notified the operators hosting the infrastructure but has not named the 6 countries or the operators; whether the equipment has been cleaned could not be verified.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

SilentAir shows that one operator's weakness can expose subscribers across an entire region. Enea rates the group a state actor with high confidence; if a formal state attribution follows, that label would put the state-sponsored attack exclusion in cyber policies up for debate. The most likely path is operators quietly installing signalling firewalls and no government making a formal attribution.

Likely effects

  • SMS authenticationNegative1–6 months

    Interception of verification codes through redirection pushes Taiwanese banks and public bodies to speed up the move away from SMS-based authentication.

  • Telecoms investmentUncertain1–6 months

    The GTP and SS7 firewalls Enea recommends mean extra security spending for operators in at least 6 countries.

  • Cyber insuranceNegative6 months+

    If a formal attribution is made, the state-level actor label could trigger claims disputes under Lloyd's state-sponsored attack exclusion.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Quiet clean-up60%

    Operators clean their equipment and install firewalls, but no country or operator is named.

    Watch: Signalling security statements from Taiwan's National Communications Commission or operators

  2. 2
    Formal attribution25%

    Taiwan's government formally attributes the attack to a state and imposes binding signalling security requirements on operators.

    Watch: A formal attribution statement from Taipei and a regulatory directive

  3. 3
    Group returns15%

    Activity Enea disrupted resumes months later on new equipment and a new wave of interception is reported.

    Watch: A new SilentAir report from Enea or other telecoms security firms

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Market reaction

Indicators affected

  • Interception share▼ 18.3%
  • Countries hosting infrastructure▼ at least 6

Sources

  1. Enea — The Enemy Within. Tracking LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir through Mobile Networks
  2. The Hacker News — SilentAir Hijacks Asian Telecom Networks to Intercept SMS 2FA Codes
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