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Container cranes and a ship at the Port of Djibouti at sunset

I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsSub-Saharan Africa

From Jeddah, US–China rivalry over African minerals opens a door for Gulf capital

Container terminal at the Port of Djibouti (December 2015)Photo: Skilla1st / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Gulf Research Center (GRC)
Author
Michael William Wilson
Country · language
Saudi Arabia (Jeddah) · English
Affiliation
Independent think tank (Jeddah)

Summary

In a commentary published by the Gulf Research Center on 15 October, Michael William Wilson argues that competition for Africa's critical minerals has entered a new phase. By his account, China processes roughly 70% of critical minerals and produces 80% of lithium-ion batteries. It has invested more than 24 billion dollars in its African mining strategy since 2000. Washington, for its part, has signed more than 160 deals worth 40 billion dollars since January 2025. In February 2026 it set up Project Vault, a 12-billion-dollar strategic minerals reserve.

Wilson lists the US moves project by project. A 1.8-billion-dollar consortium of the DFC, Orion Resources and Abu Dhabi's ADQ fund is buying 40% of Glencore's Mutanda and Kamoto copper operations in DR Congo. Gécamines has pledged up to 500,000 tonnes of copper to US buyers through Mercuria. The DFC's commitment to the Lobito corridor stands at around 800 million dollars. Haulage from Kolwezi to Dar es Salaam takes 35 days; once the line is complete, the run to Lobito will take 11. China has answered by committing about 1.4 billion dollars to rebuild the TAZARA railway under a 30-year concession.

The author's central thesis concerns the Gulf's place in all this. The Qatar Investment Authority has put 500 million dollars into Ivanhoe Mines and 180 million dollars into TechMet. Saudi Arabia plans to invest up to 15 billion dollars in global mining. In Wilson's view, Gulf states can become strategic partners in these supply chains without competing head-on with Washington or Beijing. African governments, too, can exploit the rivalry to bargain for infrastructure, power and processing capacity. Zimbabwe, which suspended exports of raw lithium concentrate in 2026, is his example.

Blind spot

The piece asserts without a source that China controls 80% of African mine output; the figure sits well above common estimates and could not be verified. It casts Gulf capital as a neutral 'third way', yet ADQ sitting in the same consortium as the US DFC undercuts that neutrality. It never discusses how the Hormuz crisis affects Gulf funds' liquidity and risk appetite. Not a single African government or local producer is heard.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The piece shows Gulf think tanks reading African mining as a field for capital returns, not as a space to mediate between the US and China. The numbers support that direction: 680 million dollars from Qatar, a stake in Abu Dhabi's 1.8-billion-dollar consortium and a 15-billion-dollar Saudi plan. Yet ADQ sharing the table with the DFC suggests the Gulf in practice stands close to the US camp. The most likely path is Gulf capital entering US-backed projects as a partner.

Likely effects

  • Copper and cobalt supplyUncertain6 months+

    The 40% stake in Mutanda and Kamoto and the 500,000-tonne copper pledge steer part of DR Congo's output towards non-Chinese buyers.

  • African logisticsPositive6 months+

    If the Lobito corridor cuts the journey from Kolwezi to the sea from 35 days to 11, an Atlantic outlet emerges that competes directly with China's TAZARA line.

  • Gulf fundsUncertain1–6 months

    Saudi Arabia's 15-billion-dollar mining plan and Qatar's investments tie the search for non-oil revenue to African mines; project risk is high because the Zambia link has not yet been built.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    The Gulf partners US projects55%

    Gulf funds take minority stakes in DFC-backed consortia, while separate deals with China stay limited.

    Watch: A new joint Gulf–DFC investment announcement in the Lobito corridor or DR Congo copper

  2. 2
    Investment on both sides30%

    Gulf capital also enters China-linked projects at the same time, and a genuine 'third way' takes shape.

    Watch: A Gulf fund announcing an African partnership with a Chinese mining or processing company

  3. 3
    Investment slows15%

    The Hormuz crisis and volatile oil revenue turn Gulf funds towards domestic priorities, and African mining plans are postponed.

    Watch: A statement from Manara Minerals or the QIA suspending African investments

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: grc.net · 15 October 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.