
III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceSouth Asia
New Delhi sees a stronger Taliban still held back by isolation
- Institution
- MP-IDSA (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)
- Author
- Priyanka Singh
- Country · language
- India · English
- Affiliation
- Defence ministry-funded institute
Summary
In a brief dated 6 October 2026 for MP-IDSA, which is funded by India's defence ministry, Priyanka Singh assesses five years of Taliban rule. Singh argues that the Taliban have consolidated power but that international isolation remains their biggest obstacle. Russia became the first country to grant them full diplomatic recognition and signed a military agreement in May 2026, while China, Pakistan and India have not formalised ties. The author contends that the Taliban have benefited as the Ukraine war and the US–Israel–Iran conflict pulled the world's attention elsewhere.
The sharpest section of the brief concerns the Pakistan front. Singh recounts that Pakistan struck suspected TTP positions in Jalalabad, Khost, Kabul and Paktika in October 2025, and that the conflict turned into an open border war in February 2026. In an air strike on 20 September 2026, 28 people were killed according to Islamabad, while the Taliban said three civilians died. In the author's view, the Taliban keep backing the TTP despite their leader Haibatullah's warning against escalation, and Pakistan is retaliating by cutting trade and deporting Afghan refugees.
On the economy and society, the brief notes that women's labour-force participation fell from 18.3% in 2019 to 5.1% in 2026. The April 2022 poppy ban cut cultivation by 95% and wiped out about $1bn of annual income, and OCHA says 21.9 million people, or 45% of the population, need aid. The brief records that India hosted Taliban foreign minister Muttaqi in October 2025 and now refers to Afghanistan as an 'extended neighbour'. Singh concludes that the US and the international community need to rethink their approach to the Taliban.
Blind spot
The brief presents India's rapprochement with the Taliban as unproblematic pragmatism. It does not discuss New Delhi's interest in keeping Pakistan hemmed in on its western border, or Islamabad's claim that India stands behind the TTP. It also leaves out that the Afghanistan–Pakistan war is running alongside tension on the India–Pakistan border, squeezing Pakistan between two fronts and straining its IMF programme and defence spending.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
IDSA's reading accepts the Taliban as a permanent actor and legitimises India's cautious rapprochement. The 20 September strike and the TTP support the brief describes show that the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict is structural rather than temporary. The most likely path is that India deepens ties with Kabul below the threshold of recognition, while Pakistan stays under pressure on two borders at once.
Likely effects
- Pakistan's security burdenNegative1–6 months
The border war under way since February 2026 and TTP attacks raise defence and security spending for a Pakistan operating under an IMF programme.
- Afghan humanitarian situationNegative6 months+
With 45% of the population needing aid, Pakistan's trade cut-off and refugee returns deepen the food and income crisis.
- India–Afghanistan tiesPositive1–6 months
The channel opened by Muttaqi's visit gives India trade routes and diplomatic reach that bypass Pakistan.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Engagement below recognition60%
India continues ministerial-level contacts with the Taliban but avoids formal recognition.
Watch: A new ministerial visit or agreement between India and the Taliban
- 2Pakistan–Taliban tension eases25%
Mediation reduces border clashes and Pakistan pauses its air strikes.
Watch: A new ceasefire between the two sides or the full reopening of border crossings
- 3India moves to formal recognition15%
Following Russia, India also grants the Taliban government diplomatic recognition.
Watch: An Indian foreign ministry announcement of recognition or an ambassadorial appointment
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: idsa.in · 6 October 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.