Houthi gains at Bab el-Mandeb bind Africa's Horn to the Middle East — Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)

Container cranes and a ship at the Port of Djibouti at sunset — Container terminal at the Port of Djibouti (December 2015)Photo: Skilla1st / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source

Institution: Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)
Author: Peter Fabricius
Country · language: South Africa · English
Affiliation: Independent security body (Pretoria)

Summary

ISS Africa's piece of 9 October asks what the territory the Houthis seized at the mouth of the Red Sea, after the US–Israeli strikes of February 2026, means for Africa. In the author's reading, the September gains handed the Houthis a de facto veto over Bab el-Mandeb, a passage that carries roughly 30% of global container traffic and 12% of annual trade. This week the Saudi-backed Yemeni government retook part of the strait, and the Houthis stepped up missile attacks on Saudi airports.

Egypt bears the heaviest economic cost. Cairo lost around 3.76 billion dollars in Suez revenue even in 2024, when attacks were less frequent. Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland are also hurt by thinner shipping traffic and higher freight and insurance premiums. Because Africa imports 98% of its refined petroleum products, rising costs in the Red Sea make both the continent's imports and its exports more expensive.

The sharper warning is about security. Since early 2025 the Houthis and al-Shabaab have built a growing relationship of arms shipments and training, a link US Africa Command describes as deeply worrying. The UN mandate for maritime inspection of weapons bound for al-Shabaab expires in November 2026. In Sudan, Saudi Arabia backs the army while the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces, and these opposing camps now face each other in northern Ethiopia as well. The author concludes that the 3 wars on either side of the Red Sea feed one another, and that Africa cannot carry the burden alone.

Blind spot

The piece casts Africa as the victim of the Houthi threat but does not examine African states' own role, for instance how foreign bases in Eritrea and Djibouti, and the UAE's presence in Somaliland and Berbera, feed the equation. There is no current 2026 figure for the freight and insurance impact; the Egyptian loss rests on 2024 data. The scale of Houthi–Shabaab arms transfers is, by the experts' own account, unverified.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

ISS no longer treats the Red Sea crisis as a shipping problem. It sees a conflict system linking the wars in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. The UN inspection mandate expiring in November 2026 is the first test of that system. The most likely path is a renewed mandate that still fails to cut the Houthi–Shabaab supply line at sea, leaving arms flowing into the Horn of Africa.

Likely effects

Freight and insuranceNegativeWeeks
A handful of targeted attacks at Bab el-Mandeb could be enough to close the passage in practice, raising the cost of the refined products Africa imports at a 98% rate.
Egyptian revenueNegative1–6 months
Suez income, already 3.76 billion dollars lower in 2024, cannot recover while Houthi pressure persists, widening Egypt's external financing needs.
Somali securityNegative1–6 months
Transfers of drones and missiles from the Houthis to Shabaab could restrict the African Union mission's use of airspace.

Possibilities, ranked

1
Managed escalation50%
The UN mandate is renewed and the Yemeni government holds part of the strait, but intermittent Houthi attacks keep transits risky.
Watch: Whether the UN Security Council renews the Somalia arms inspection mandate in November 2026
2
Regional battlefield35%
The Ethiopia–Eritrea and Sudan fronts merge through their Gulf backers, and the African coast of the Red Sea becomes a theatre of war.
Watch: A Houthi-linked attack off the Eritrean coast or Djibouti
3
Houthi pressure recedes15%
Saudi-backed forces retake the area around Bab el-Mandeb for good and transits recover.
Watch: Two consecutive monthly increases in Suez Canal transit numbers

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: issafrica.org · 9 October 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.