Pakistan can find fuel in the Hormuz crisis but struggles to pay

Summary

ISSI's issue brief of 8 October treats Pakistan's dependence on imported fuel less as an energy-system problem than as a balance-of-payments one. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, the petroleum group import bill rose 5.76% in fiscal 2025–26 to 16.86 billion dollars. Crude imports climbed 31.58%, while the LNG bill fell 36.10% to 2.22 billion dollars. The author does not pin that drop solely on the attacks on Qatar: in January 2026, with demand running below contracted volumes, surplus Qatari cargoes had already been diverted to other buyers.

The brief treats oil and LNG as separate risks. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz fell to 4.9 million barrels a day in the second quarter of 2026, against 21.6 million in the final quarter of 2025. The strikes of 18–19 March hit 2 LNG trains at Ras Laffan, and QatarEnergy said 12.8 million tonnes a year of capacity would be offline for 3–5 years. Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline to Yanbu offers a partial outlet for oil, but attacks at Bab el-Mandeb are narrowing that route too.

The buffer is thin. On 30 March the government reported 23–24 days of diesel stocks and roughly 11 days of crude; central bank reserves stood at 16.35 billion dollars on 13 March. A feasibility study for a strategic petroleum reserve began in August 2026, but the scheme is still at the planning stage. The brief sets out 6 recommendations: a phased strategic stockpile, flexible LNG contracts, non-Gulf supply, refinery upgrades, a permanent energy crisis mechanism and lower oil demand in transport.