
III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceEurasia
US force pushes the Russia–Iran partnership towards defence, Moscow and Tehran argue
- Institution
- Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
- Author
- Igor Matveev, Qasem Osuli Odlu
- Country · language
- Russia and Iran · English
- Affiliation
- Council co-founded by the state
Summary
The piece RIAC published on 12 October is co-written by two academics, one in Moscow and one in Tehran: Igor Matveev of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation and Qasem Osuli Odlu of Allameh Tabataba'i University. Their argument is that US use of force and Western sanctions are pushing the two countries into military, political and economic interdependence. The authors take as their starting point Trump's remark at the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2026 that he could destroy Iran if there is no deal.
According to the authors, Russia has avoided open military support for Iran during the 8-month war despite the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty the two signed, but the treaty could shift from non-military areas towards defence. The areas of cooperation they propose are advanced weapons, surveillance data and cyber technology. They openly acknowledge that tension around the Strait of Hormuz benefits Russia economically by lifting oil prices and easing sanctions pressure.
Two new blocs stand out in their regional picture: the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, and Israel's proposed Hexagon, which would include India, Greece and Cyprus. In the authors' view the latter pushes Iran towards China and Russia. A new US sanctions plan targeting Iran's banking sector and oil exports, meanwhile, puts the spotlight on non-dollar trade and on the unfinished financing of the North–South Transport Corridor. At the SCO summit in Bishkek on 1 September, Pezeshkian called relations strategic, and both leaders also attended the BRICS summit in New Delhi on 11 September.
Blind spot
The piece concedes that Russia gains from the war but gives no oil price, trade volume or sanctions figure, and the proposed military cooperation stays hypothetical. Russia's 2023 backing of a Gulf declaration on the UAE's claim to 3 Persian Gulf islands is cited as an irritant, but there is no discussion of whether Moscow's OPEC+ ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE brake military support for Iran. The anti-Russian debate inside Iran is almost absent.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
This joint text by a Russian and an Iranian academic reflects Moscow's wish to preserve the current balance, in which it profits economically from the war without giving Iran open military support. The call for defence cooperation should also be read as a bargaining chip in US talks over Ukraine. The most likely path is a quiet deepening of limited technology and data sharing, with no announced arms transfers.
Likely effects
- Oil pricesNegative1–6 months
As the authors concede, tension around Hormuz supports demand for and the price of Russian oil; Moscow has little incentive to de-escalate.
- Sanctions regimeUncertain1–6 months
The US sanctions plan targeting Iranian banking pushes Russia–Iran trade further into non-dollar channels and towards the North–South corridor.
- TürkiyePositive1–6 months
Tehran does not read the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement as a threat, which leaves Türkiye room for a non-confrontational balance with Iran.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Quiet deepening60%
Russia steps up sharing of surveillance data and cyber technology, but no open arms transfer or military intervention is announced.
Watch: Independent reports of Russian-made air defence or electronic warfare systems sighted in Iran
- 2Open defence alliance25%
A defence clause is added to the treaty, or Moscow announces a major arms shipment to Iran.
Watch: A new agreement signed at a meeting of the Russian and Iranian defence ministers
- 3Moscow keeps its distance15%
US–Russia talks over Ukraine advance and Russia keeps its support for Iran at the diplomatic level.
Watch: A joint statement on the Middle East at a US–Russia summit
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: russiancouncil.ru · 12 October 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.