Sanctions moved Sudan's war economy rather than breaking it, monitor says

Summary

A 54-page October 2026 report by STPT, a Sudan-focused monitoring group, was publicised by Dabanga on 13 October. It finds that since the war began in April 2023, Canada, the EU, the UK, the UN and the US have sanctioned a total of 32 individuals and 20 companies. The authors measure sanctions against three effects: deterrence, disruption and norm signalling. They conclude that more than three years of sanctions have disrupted some financial and supply channels but have not dismantled the networks financing the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

According to the report, the army's Defence Industries System (DIS) generated an estimated $2 billion a year in profit before the war, and the army dominates four-fifths of the national economy. The army-owned Zadna, sanctioned by three authorities, the EU, the UK and the US, shifted much of its business to Egypt and the Gulf, grew, and positioned itself for post-war reconstruction contracts. On the RSF side, the sanctioned Al Junaid company, one of two cases the report examines, helped the Dagalo family keep a limited but independent arms-procurement capacity.

The report documents that when supply channels narrowed, the parties turned to at least three alternative markets, Pakistan, Iran and Russia, or to domestic production using hard-to-trace precursor materials. A table in the annex shows a DIS delegation signed a $230 million arms deal with Pakistan in October 2025. Türkiye, five months after DIS was sanctioned, concluded a deal for TB2 and Akıncı drones in November 2023; neither supplier is on a sanctions list. The authors note explicitly that this evidence does not on its own prove sanctions caused the shift. The report's 2026 recommendations include extending the UN arms embargo to the whole country, covering subsidiaries and joint ventures, and diplomatic engagement with Egypt and the Gulf states.