From Moscow, Poland turns from Ukraine's EU engine into its brake

Summary

In a piece dated 7 October 2026, Anton Bespalov, a programme director at the Valdai Club, argues that Poland may now act as a brake on Ukraine's European integration. In the early 2000s, Warsaw had been the driving force behind that process. The author says the 2026 reversal is economic rather than ideological: Poles are not prepared to bear the cost of accession. Bespalov reports that Polish support for Ukraine's rapid EU membership fell from 60% in March 2022 to 9% in July 2026. Over the same period, outright opposition to membership rose from 2% to 40%.

The piece lists 3 ruptures in the spring and summer of 2026. In the first, a Ukrainian unit was named after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and President Karol Nawrocki withdrew Zelenskiy's Order of the White Eagle. In the second and third, Warsaw hinted that it would not back EU membership unless Kyiv changed its historical policy, and a swap of fighter jets for drone technology was thrown into doubt. According to Bespalov, 1.5–1.9 million Ukrainian citizens live in Poland, about 970,000 of them registered refugees. In a May poll, 40% of respondents rejected the view that Ukraine is defending Poland.

The author traces the divergence to an income gap that has opened over 30 years. In 1991 the two countries had roughly equal per capita incomes. By 2004 Poland's was 1.5 times higher, and by 2021 more than twice as high. In 2021 Poland ranked second among Ukraine's trading partners, behind China. Bespalov leaves 4 open questions for the post-war period: Poland's role in reconstruction, new waves of migration, the risk of arms smuggling and the military balance.