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III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceSouth Asia

Indian defence institute sees a conventional war rehearsal in the Karakoram drill

Cochin Port, Vallarpadam Island, Kerala, India (2026)Photo: Rangan Datta Wiki / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
Author
Namita Barthwal
Country · language
India · English
Affiliation
Defence ministry-backed institute

Summary

In a commentary on 12 November, Namita Barthwal of MP-IDSA's Centre for Military Affairs examines a nine-day exercise held by the Chinese and Pakistani armies in Korla, Xinjiang, on 14–22 October 2026. The drill was officially presented as high-altitude counter-terrorism training. The author disputes that framing, arguing that most of the capabilities on display also suit conventional warfare. The series, launched in 2013 and resumed in 2024 after a five-year pause, has this time expanded from special forces to regular army units.

The author identifies four innovations. Quadruped robots entered buildings ahead of soldiers. Type 08 infantry fighting vehicles carried roof cages against drones, which she reads as a lesson drawn from the Russia–Ukraine war. Drones and ground sensors located targets, and snipers and strike elements opened fire. Swarms of attack drones went in ahead of the infantry. The commentary also notes that Chinese manufacturers accounted for about 95% of global humanoid robot shipments in 2025.

The lessons drawn for India fall under three headings. The army should train to conceal and disperse under constant drone surveillance. The reconnaissance-to-strike chain should be tested in conditions where communications are degraded. Changes in Pakistan's procurement and doctrine should be tracked over years rather than judged from a single exercise. The piece also notes that India approved 2.12 lakh crore rupees for drones, artillery and missile defence in October 2026.

Blind spot

The commentary counts Pakistan's reliance on Chinese weapons only as a gain. It cites some 3,400 combat losses suffered by Pakistan in 2025 but does not discuss how far that burden has drained the army's capacity. It mentions China's policies in Xinjiang in a single sentence and moves on. Pakistan's external financing constraints and its ability to pay for new platforms are absent. Data on India's own weaknesses are limited to the names of three exercises.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The Indian reading treats Karakoram not as a one-off show but as a gradual increase in the Chinese and Pakistani armies' ability to operate together. Drone swarms, robotic reconnaissance and the sensor-to-strike chain have moved to the centre of Indian planning since the May 2025 clash. The most likely path is that Pakistan's dependence on Chinese platforms deepens and India accelerates spending on drones and electronic warfare.

Likely effects

  • South Asian military balanceNegative1–6 months

    China's transfer of robotic and drone systems to Pakistan forces India to operate under constant surveillance along its land border.

  • Indian defence spendingUncertain1–6 months

    The 2.12 lakh crore rupee approval in October 2026 shows that a procurement wave shifting towards drones and missile defence has only just begun.

  • Turkish defence industryNegative6 months+

    As Pakistan's army grows used to Chinese platforms, competition in the Pakistani market will toughen for Turkish drone and armoured vehicle makers.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Gradual integration continues60%

    The exercise series continues annually, Pakistan adds Chinese drones and robots to its inventory, and India raises counter-drone spending.

    Watch: A Pakistani army announcement of new unmanned system purchases from China

  2. 2
    Border tensions escalate25%

    An incident on the Line of Control brings forward the field use of new systems, raising the risk of a clash like that of May 2025.

    Watch: Official statements on drone use along the Line of Control

  3. 3
    Payment constraints slow it15%

    Pakistan's external financing squeeze delays new platform purchases and cooperation stays at the exercise level.

    Watch: Pakistan's defence budget and IMF programme reviews

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: idsa.in · 12 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.