ISS finds South African municipal corruption runs daily, not by election cycle — Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)

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Institution: Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)
Author: Romi Sigsworth, Nicky Prins, Florencia Belvedere
Country · language: South Africa · English
Affiliation: Independent institute

Summary

ACTis, the ISS corruption-tracking system, examined 20 municipalities in an analysis published a day before the 4 November local elections: 9 local, 3 district and 8 metropolitan. The team screened records from the past 3–5 years with an AI tool developed for the ISS. Its conclusion is that corruption stems not from isolated cases but from a system that reproduces itself. It found systemic irregularity in financial controls in 17 of the 20 municipalities, and irregular appointments facilitating corruption in 14.

On procurement, there is evidence of corrupt tenders in 5 municipalities and a pattern of repeated irregular awards to the same contractor in 11. One example is a swimming pool project in Buffalo City, where costs rose from 22 million rand to 71 million rand and the work is still unfinished. KwaDukuza received 1.2 billion rand in disaster grants after the 2023 floods and handed out irregular contracts. Nine municipalities actively obstruct accountability, and networks tying officials to private interests were identified in 6 of the 8 metros.

The authors argue that oversight bodies have no trouble producing findings; the problem is that nothing is done with them. Every year the Auditor-General uncovers irregular expenditure that goes uninvestigated, while most implicated officials stay in post or move to another institution. They propose five steps: review appointments, implement audit remedies, investigate suspect deals, enforce sanctions and verify progress through external oversight. In the sample, only Midvaal, Swartland and Ehlanzeni stand out as clean and resilient municipalities.

Blind spot

The sample is limited to 20 municipalities and the selection criteria are not disclosed, so it is unclear whether the findings can be generalised nationally. No total rand figure for irregular expenditure is given, which makes it impossible to gauge the weight of the problem on municipal budgets and electricity debts. Nor does the piece explain why the three clean municipalities have stayed different.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The ISS reading suggests that even if the 4 November election changes who runs the councils, it will not by itself fix the systemic irregularity found in 17 of 20 municipalities. The binding constraint is not a lack of findings but a failure to enforce sanctions. The most likely path is that new coalitions largely inherit existing appointment and procurement practices, with improvement confined to a handful of metros.

Likely effects

Municipal servicesNegative1–6 months
Irregular tenders and inflated projects, such as the pool whose cost rose from 22 million to 71 million rand, are eating into maintenance and infrastructure budgets.
Post-election coalitionsNegativeWeeks
Networks of vested interests in 6 of the 8 metros raise the risk that new coalition partners put bargaining over appointments ahead of service delivery.
Oversight bodiesUncertain6 months+
If the gap between the institutions that produce findings and those that enforce sanctions persists, Auditor-General reports will remain documents without consequences.

Possibilities, ranked

1
The system is inherited55%
New administrations keep most existing appointments, and audit findings are again only partly implemented.
Watch: Appointments of chief financial officers and municipal managers in the metros within the first 100 days after the election
2
Selective clean-up35%
Under external oversight pressure, a few metros remove implicated officials while local municipalities fall behind.
Watch: Number of disciplinary actions based on SIU and Auditor-General findings
3
Systemic reform10%
National government makes appointment and procurement rules binding on municipalities and monitors their implementation.
Watch: A new national regulation or bill on municipal appointments

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: issafrica.org · 3 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.