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Container cranes and a ship at the Port of Djibouti at sunset

III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceSub-Saharan Africa

ISS sees Congolese refugees trapped between war and closing borders

Container terminal at the Port of Djibouti (December 2015)Photo: Skilla1st / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)
Author
Tatien Nkeshimana, Veronica Chepseba, Bram Verelst
Country · language
South Africa · English
Affiliation
Independent think tank

Summary

According to an ISS analysis published on 2 November, the war in eastern Congo has turned a protracted refugee problem into a regional emergency. In June 2026, UNHCR counted 1.25 million Congolese refugees and asylum seekers, 80% of them in neighbouring countries. More than 245,000 new arrivals were recorded between January 2025 and April 2026. Burundi received around 142,000 new arrivals, while Uganda hosts 53% of Congolese refugees.

The authors argue that the collapse in funding is turning returns from voluntary into forced. In February, UNHCR raised only 20% of the 35 million dollars needed for Burundi. The International Rescue Committee reported that the refugee health response in Uganda was only 6% funded for 2026. When the Burundi–Congo border reopened in February, 33,000 people returned spontaneously within a month. UNHCR, for its part, advises against returns to South and North Kivu; facilitated return to M23-held areas is not possible.

Host countries are narrowing their doors too. In October 2026, Burundi banned entry to people coming from or transiting through M23 areas, and Uganda is turning back non-essential Congolese travellers on Ebola grounds. More than 80% of Congolese refugees in Rwanda want to return but are waiting for conditions to improve. In the authors' view, the 2025 Washington agreements and the Doha process will not produce a lasting solution unless they put refugee rights at the centre.

Blind spot

The analysis combines UNHCR and aid agency figures from different dates in a single frame; the 142,000 new arrivals in Burundi also include returning Burundians. Allegations of surveillance and detention in Burundi rest on a single media source. Why donors have pulled back, and how much of the funding gap is due to US aid cuts, is not broken down in figures.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The ISS reading shows that peace agreements in the Great Lakes are failing to manage population movements on the ground. With 1.25 million people dependent on programmes funded at between 6% and 20%, returns are driven more by deprivation than by security. The most likely path is that border restrictions persist and armed groups keep using the unresolved refugee question as a recruitment pretext.

Likely effects

  • Regional securityNegative1–6 months

    M23, the FDLR and Burundian rebels using the refugee issue in the camps as a pretext feeds the security dilemma between Rwanda, Burundi and Congo.

  • Humanitarian capacityNegativeWeeks

    A health response in Uganda funded at 6% means service cuts for more than 1 million refugees and adds to the pressure for forced returns.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Restricted status quo55%

    Border bans and camp restrictions persist, the funding gap stays open, and returns remain small and spontaneous.

    Watch: Funding levels of UNHCR appeals for Burundi and Uganda

  2. 2
    Wave of forced returns30%

    Aid cuts and M23 encouragement trigger large-scale returns to unsafe areas of Kivu.

    Watch: UNHCR counts of spontaneous returns to Kivu and camp evacuations in M23-held areas

  3. 3
    Regional framework and new funding15%

    Refugee rights are added to the Washington and Doha processes, donors raise funding and independent monitoring begins.

    Watch: The Rwanda–Congo return commission setting up an independent monitoring mechanism

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: issafrica.org · 2 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.