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III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceSouth Asia

India belongs at the Eurasian Charter table, not on its signature page

Cochin Port, Vallarpadam Island, Kerala, India (2026)Photo: Rangan Datta Wiki / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Russia in Global Affairs (Rossiya v globalnoy politike)
Author
Sujal Yadav
Country · language
Russia · English
Affiliation
Moscow-based foreign policy journal

Summary

Sujal Yadav, of the Russian and Central Asian studies centre at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, weighs the Eurasian Charter proposed by Russia and Belarus against Indian interests in a piece published by the Moscow journal on 14 October. Nine countries signed the charter's joint declaration in New York on 25 September, during the 81st session of the UN General Assembly: Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Myanmar, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. India did not sign. The text provides for decisions by consensus and adoption at a leaders' summit before the end of 2027. Drafting is due to start at the Minsk Security Conference in November.

In the author's view, India already shares the charter's three core ideas: indivisible security, multipolarity and dialogue between civilisations. The joint statement of the 23rd India–Russia summit in December 2025 used the same language. The real risk is staying out: if China joins later, the text will have taken shape without reflecting Indian concerns. Yadav also recalls US pressure; in August 2025 Washington doubled tariffs on Indian goods over purchases of Russian oil.

Yadav sets out eight concrete proposals. He wants a clause barring any single regional power from setting the rules in Asia, a link between indivisible security and the principle of denying sanctuary to cross-border militants, and guarantees that the North–South Transport Corridor and the Chennai–Vladivostok maritime corridor stay open in times of tension. He suggests that India and Russia table a joint statement of principles before the first round. Belarus, in his view, should open the co-chairmanship to a non-founding country such as India, and New Delhi should send experts rather than ministers to keep its final decision open.

Blind spot

The author founded an India–Eurasia research forum, and the piece ran in a journal belonging to Moscow, which owns the initiative; the framing is favourable from the outset. The reputational cost to India of Iran and Myanmar being among the nine signatories goes undiscussed. Two days later, on 16 October, the US suspended the 100% tariff only through a revocable waiver; the effect of the Minsk table on trade talks with Washington is not assessed.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The piece shows that New Delhi's pro-Russian academic circle favours shaping the Eurasian Charter from within rather than rejecting it. But since 16 October India depends on an open-ended yet revocable US waiver, which raises the cost of high-level participation in the Minsk process. The most likely path is for India to stay away from signing while following the drafting process at expert level.

Likely effects

  • India–US relationsNegative1–6 months

    Ministerial-level participation in a Russian–Belarusian initiative whose signatories include Iran and Myanmar would give Washington fresh grounds for pressure in trade talks conducted under a revocable 100% tariff waiver.

  • Russia–China balanceUncertain6 months+

    The clause the author proposes against any single regional power also gives Moscow a reason to draw India into the drafting to offset Beijing's weight.

  • Connectivity corridorsPositive6 months+

    Writing the North–South corridor and the Chennai–Vladivostok route into the text would give institutional footing to India's wish to keep trading with Russia through periods of sanctions.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Watching at expert level55%

    India stays away from signing and joins November's Minsk drafting round as an observer or at expert level.

    Watch: India's level of participation at the Minsk Security Conference in November

  2. 2
    Contribution via a joint statement30%

    India and Russia table a joint statement of principles before the first round; India helps shape the draft but defers signing.

    Watch: Publication of an India–Russia joint document or an offer of co-chairmanship

  3. 3
    Staying out entirely15%

    Under US trade pressure, New Delhi takes no part in the Minsk process at all.

    Watch: India sending no representative to the Minsk drafting round

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: eng.globalaffairs.ru · 14 October 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.