I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsSub-Saharan Africa
Seen from Moscow, arms, grain and debt relief deepen ties with Africa
- Institution
- Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
- Author
- Elizaveta Leyb
- Country · language
- Russia · English
- Affiliation
- Council co-founded by the state
Summary
In a piece published by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) on 2 October 2026, MGIMO student Elizaveta Leyb reviews the results of the 2023 Russia–Africa Summit three years on. She recalls that all 54 African countries attended the first summit in 2019, 45 of them at head-of-state level. In her view, cooperation has gained substance since 2023: Russia–Africa trade rose from $18bn in 2022 to about $28bn in 2025. Agricultural exports grew 19% in 2023-2024 to $7bn, then expanded 40% in the first half of 2026 to $2.9bn.
On security, Leyb writes that some 150 agreements worth more than $20bn have been signed with 48 African countries since 2023, and that Moscow supplies about a third of the continent's arms deliveries. Citing the head of Rosoboronexport, she reports that Africa accounts for 30% of the company's order book. According to the author, Russia wrote off $23bn of Soviet-era debt in 2023 and $20bn in 2024. She lists the obstacles as public-sector indifference to investment, legal and media regulation, gaps in language skills and logistics, and trade concentrated in low value-added raw materials.
Blind spot
What the West misses: Russia's weight in Africa rests not only on mercenaries but on grain exports, debt relief and an arms order book. The weakness: the piece is written by a student and counts Africa Corps as a success while ignoring setbacks on the ground, such as the loss of Kidal in Mali in April. Nor does it say how much of the arms business has been delivered or how it is paid for.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
RIAC's reading shows Moscow measuring its Africa policy by trade, grain and its arms book rather than by military presence. The figures point to a growing relationship, but $28bn of trade still rests on raw materials, and the pillars beyond arms and grain are weak. The most likely path is that Russian influence concentrates in a handful of Sahel and North African states where it has security partnerships, while staying limited across the continent.
Likely effects
- African arms marketUncertain1–6 months
Africa's 30% share of Rosoboronexport's order book makes the continent a critical market for Russian defence exports, and Moscow will be ready to pay a political price to keep that tie.
- Food securityNegative1–6 months
A 40% jump in agricultural exports in the first half of 2026 shows Africa growing more dependent on Russian grain and fertiliser, and more exposed to disruption on the Black Sea route.
- Türkiye's African competitionNegative6 months+
Russia's one-third share of arms deliveries means direct competition for the same customer base with Türkiye, which is expanding its defence exports in Africa.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Selective deepening55%
Russia grows trade and arms ties in a limited number of countries where it has security partnerships; continent-wide engagement stays weak.
Watch: The number of countries attending the next Russia–Africa summit at head-of-state level
- 2Trade diversifies25%
The planned investment fund comes on stream and the relationship moves beyond raw materials and arms.
Watch: Announcement of the founding and capital of a Russia–Africa private investment fund
- 3Retreat on the ground20%
Military setbacks in the Sahel damage Africa Corps' reputation and some partners review security cooperation.
Watch: A Sahel government suspending or scaling back its agreement with Africa Corps
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: russiancouncil.ru · 2 October 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.