I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsSub-Saharan Africa
The Middle East maritime crisis has brought South Africa no gain
- Institution
- Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)
- Author
- Timothy Walker
- Country · language
- South Africa · English
- Affiliation
- Independent security body (Pretoria)
Summary
Timothy Walker, a consultant at the Pretoria-based ISS, wrote in the ISS Today series on 25 September 2026. He argues that disruptions at Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have made Southern Africa more important but not richer. Container shipping has avoided the Red Sea since 2023 and shifted to the Cape of Good Hope route. According to the author, the diverted ships have little need to call at the region's ports. South African ports, including Cape Town and Durban, still sit near the bottom of the World Bank's latest container port performance ranking in 2026. Walker attributes this to years of underinvestment and congestion.
The second axis of the piece is energy. Africa exports about 75% of its crude oil production and imports a large share of its refined product. When Asian buyers outbid African markets for West African crude and refined fuel, the cost of shipping fuel to the region also rises in 2026. Walker writes that the fuel protests seen in Kenya, the Comoros and Mozambique in May 2026 could recur with new price rises. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, which bypasses Hormuz, is not safe either: drone attacks shut it temporarily in September 2026. TotalEnergies resumed work on its 20 billion dollar Mozambique LNG project in January 2026. The author warns that the pressure to capture this demand could lock the region into new fossil fuel dependence. He adds that the insurgency in northern Mozambique and rising tanker traffic are increasing the risk of accidents.
Blind spot
What the West misses: in Europe the Red Sea crisis is read in terms of freight rates and delivery times. This piece shows that the coasts the route has shifted to gain no share and pay through higher fuel prices. Weakness: the piece gives only two figures (the three-quarters export share and 20 billion dollars). It offers no series on ship transits, port revenue or fuel prices, and does not spell out what the regional response should be.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The piece shows that in chokepoint crises the winner is not automatically the coast along the alternative route. The Cape route gained ship traffic, but port inefficiency prevented that traffic from turning into revenue. The most likely direction is that Southern Africa's strategic importance keeps rising while pressure from fuel costs persists. The uncertainty lies in when the Red Sea will again be considered safe.
Likely effects
- African fuel pricesNegativeWeeks
Countries that export their crude and import refined product compete with Asian buyers for the same cargoes, and lengthened tanker voyages push freight up as well.
- South African portsNegative1–6 months
As congestion and underinvestment persist, ships rounding the Cape sail on without calling at port. The rise in traffic does not turn into bunkering and service revenue.
- East African LNG investmentUncertain6 months+
Hormuz risk strengthens demand for LNG projects off Mozambique, but the insurgency in northern Mozambique and maritime security risk make the timetable uncertain.
- Türkiye's trade with AsiaNegative1–6 months
As Asia–Mediterranean cargoes keep sailing round the Cape, delivery times and freight rates stay high for containers bound for Türkiye.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Importance rises, gains do not follow60%
Cape traffic stays high, port performance does not improve noticeably and pressure from fuel costs continues.
Watch: The position of Cape Town and Durban in the next edition of the World Bank's container port performance ranking
- 2New fuel protests25%
New price rises trigger street protests in East and Southern Africa similar to those in May.
Watch: Monthly fuel price announcements in Kenya and Mozambique
- 3A joint regional response15%
Southern African countries set up a joint mechanism for maritime security and oil spill response.
Watch: The final communiqué of the Southern African Development Community ministerial meeting
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: issafrica.org · 30 September 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.