The bargaining table on the eve of the summit: 512 tonnes of magnets, unsold chips, a truce of 3 to 24 months and a postponed Taiwan package

Calendar and framework: no grand bargain

Xi lands at Joint Base Andrews on the afternoon of 23 September; on the morning of 24 September there is an official welcome at the White House, a bilateral meeting during the day and a state dinner in the evening, followed by a visit to the National Archives on 25 September. This is Xi's first visit to the White House since 2015. According to the Seoul Economic Daily, Trade Representative Greer said he did not expect a truce extension deal this week and that there would be no grand bargain because of the differences between the two countries' economic and political systems. The second leg of the calendar is the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November.

Sources diverge on the truce term. According to CSIS's 22 September analysis, Treasury Secretary Bessent rejected China's request for a 2-year extension and offered 6 months; according to Breitbart, Greer said they could support an extension of 3 to 6 months; the Seoul Economic Daily wrote that China wanted a term longer than 6 months. The common denominator is that the US is not inclined to lock in the 10 November expiry with an extension of 1 year or more. According to CSIS, China is also seeking approval for low or zero tariffs on about $30 billion of its exports; the Board of Trade, which Greer says is now up and running, is focusing on non-sensitive items such as consumer goods, agriculture, energy and medical devices.

Critical minerals: China's lever has become measurable

According to a report citing Bloomberg, China's rare-earth magnet shipments to the US fell 21% month on month to 512 tonnes in August. The 2026 monthly average is about 504 tonnes, 18.8% below the 2024 pace of 621 tonnes before the export controls. According to SMM, China's magnet exports to all markets fell 18% year on year to 5,010 tonnes in August, but the January–August total, at 41,890 tonnes, was up 23% year on year. In other words, China's overall export capacity has not been curtailed; the share going to the US is being selectively kept narrow.

According to the same report, Beijing is discussing offering additional export licences as a bargaining chip at the summit, while the US takes the view that China has not fully met its rare-earth commitments under the truce. This picture shows that the rare-earth suspension we identified as leverage in our 15 September report can now be tracked with flow data: September customs data will be the first test of any licence promise made at the summit.

Chip controls: the US lever is eroding by itself

In December 2025 the US allowed sales of H200 and similar chips to approved Chinese customers. According to a timeline compiled by WhatLedTo, a Commerce Department official told Congress on 14 July that very few H200s had been shipped to China; on 26 August Nvidia took a $0.4 billion charge for excess H200 inventory, acknowledged that Beijing had restricted licensed sales and removed China data centre revenue from its outlook entirely. This means chip licences have lost their function as a reward: Beijing itself is limiting passage through the door the US opened, in order to protect domestic chipmakers.

Pressure in the opposite direction is growing in Washington. In a letter to Trump on 18 September, House China Committee Chairman Moolenaar called for tighter controls on advanced AI products, closing cloud service loopholes and halting sales of US and allied chipmaking equipment. Meanwhile, Nvidia CEO Huang and OpenAI CEO Altman are among the guests at the state dinner. The only concrete output on AI is the incident notification channel proposed by Bessent and a second round to be held in Shenzhen in about 2 months. PIIE's 18 September assessment stresses that trust between the parties is close to zero and that even merely discussing safeguards would count as progress.

Tariffs: a new lever from outside the truce

The tariff dimension of the bargaining changed on 18 September. The Lindsey O. Graham Russia and Iran Sanctions Act signed by Trump provides for tariffs of up to 100% on the 5 largest buyers of Russian crude and natural gas over the previous 12 months and takes effect within 30 days. China is foremost among these buyers. The law also contains an exemption for countries that significantly reduce purchases of Russian energy. Washington thus holds a second tariff instrument, independent of the 10 November truce and with a timetable coinciding with the summit; this instrument ties Beijing's stance on the Iran and Russia files to the trade table.

On the market side, summit expectations are already being priced: according to the Seoul Economic Daily, WTI crude fell 4.5% to $96.78 a barrel. China's August trade surplus of $119.09 billion, meanwhile, is testing US patience in the tariff bargaining.

Taiwan: the package is tied to the truce timetable

According to a Semafor report of 21 September, Taiwan will not feature as prominently at this summit as it did in May, and Trump plans to postpone the already-suspended arms package until after the APEC summit in November. The suspended package is worth about $14 billion. According to CSIS, Taipei's main concern is a shift in US declaratory language from saying it does not support independence to saying it opposes it, as well as transit restrictions.

This makes Taiwan part of the truce timetable: if the truce is extended by 3 to 6 months, the fate of the package could remain uncertain for the same period. Taiwan's lever continues to be its semiconductor capacity; but what will be measured on 24 September is the verb used for Taiwan in the joint text.

What to watch

Four thresholds stand out: whether the summit text states the truce term in figures; whether magnet shipments to the US exceed 600 tonnes in the September customs data due in mid-October; whether China is placed on the target list as the Russia-Iran sanctions law's 30-day entry-into-force period expires; and whether the date for notifying Congress of the Taiwan package slips past APEC. On chips, whether the equipment restrictions called for in the Moolenaar letter turn into a post-summit regulation will show whether the US is trying to rebuild its leverage.