MediumI Geo-Economics & Chokepoints8 September 2026, Tuesday
Drone incident at the CPC terminal in Novorossiysk halts loadings, highlighting Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia for oil exports
About 82% of Kazakhstan's 78.7 million tonnes of oil exports in 2025 went through the CPC pipeline. Loadings recovered by 22% in August, but disruptions in January and July caused 3.5 million tonnes of lost output.
According to the Times of Central Asia, a drone incident near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal close to Novorossiysk briefly halted oil loadings on 8 September 2026. Kazakhstan exported a total of 78.7 million tonnes of oil in 2025, of which 64.8 million tonnes, or about 82%, went via the CPC. Disruptions in January and July caused about 3.5 million tonnes of lost output. As a result, Kazakhstan cut its 2026 production forecast from 98 million tonnes to about 96 million tonnes. According to Pipeline & Gas Journal, CPC exports rose by 22% month on month in August to 6.288 million tonnes (1.6 million barrels per day). The January–August total, however, stood at 44.8 million tonnes, down 8% on the previous year.
Alternative routes are far from closing this gap. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline carries only 1.2 million tonnes of Kazakh oil a year. Azerbaijan says it is ready to offer capacity of up to 2.2 million tonnes. The Atyrau–Samara pipeline, meanwhile, again connects to the Russian system. According to Baird Maritime, Russia has diverted some Kazakh transit oil from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk, expecting that Ukraine will not target vessels carrying non-Russian oil. September loadings are expected to fall to about 1.5 million barrels per day because of maintenance at Karachaganak. Disruptions at the CPC keep the supply risk in Brent and interest in the Middle Corridor and the BTC alive.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The drone incident was brief, but it again showed that about 82% of Kazakhstan's exports depend on a single Russian port. Because alternative routes lack the capacity to fill the gap, intermittent disruptions at the CPC while the war lasts are the most likely path. That means a risk of further downward revisions to Kazakh output targets and greater interest in the Middle Corridor and the BTC, though no rapid route shift should be expected.
Likely effects
- Oil supply riskNegativeWeeks
Every stoppage at Novorossiysk puts at risk a flow of around 1.5 million barrels a day, keeping the supply-risk premium and upward pressure alive in an already elevated Brent.
- Türkiye and the Middle CorridorPositive6 months+
Kazakhstan's search for alternative routes puts the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan line and Ceyhan in focus; Azerbaijan's offer of up to 2.2 million tonnes of capacity modestly strengthens Türkiye's energy transit role.
- Kazakh economyNegative1–6 months
The January and July outages caused 3.5 million tonnes of lost output and a cut in the 2026 forecast from 98 to 96 million tonnes; further stoppages would add pressure on export revenue and the budget.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Flows continue with intermittent stoppages70%
CPC loadings continue with brief pauses; Kazakhstan struggles to meet its output target but exports still flow largely through the CPC.
Watch: CPC monthly loading data and new drone incidents around Novorossiysk.
- 2Recovery and normalisation20%
After maintenance at Karachaganak, loadings return to August levels and no new serious incident occurs.
Watch: October loadings returning to around 1.6 million barrels a day.
- 3Protracted serious outage10%
Lasting damage to terminal infrastructure halts loadings for weeks, Kazakhstan cuts production and Brent comes under sharp upward pressure.
Watch: Reports of damage to the terminal's single-point moorings and loadings halted for more than a week.
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.