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Aerial panorama of the Singapore Strait and the Pasir Panjang container terminal

I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsAsia-Pacific

A former Chinese diplomat argues the WTO's best days are over

Singapore Strait and Pasir Panjang Port Terminal (2016)Photo: Bob Tan / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
China-US Focus (China-United States Exchange Foundation)
Author
Zhou Xiaoming
Country · language
China · English
Affiliation
Hong Kong-based foundation (CUSEF)

Summary

Zhou Xiaoming, a retired deputy permanent representative of China to the UN Office at Geneva, argues in a piece published on 2 October 2026 that the WTO-centred trading system is past its peak. In his view the organisation will not regain the central role it held from 1995 to 2015 for at least 10 years, and a fragmented trade order will become entrenched. Zhou says the countries that wrote the rules are now dismantling them: the US applies Section 301 tariffs to some 60 partners, stretches the national security exception from steel to chip equipment and drones, and has imposed a 25% chip tariff on security grounds.

He also accuses the EU of quietly eroding the system while praising the WTO. Its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism took effect before any international agreement on carbon measurement, countervailing duties were imposed on Chinese electric vehicles without a WTO ruling, and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation grants powers to block tenders and mergers. Zhou explains China's structural disadvantage through Article I of the GATT: any zero tariff Beijing grants Washington must be extended to the other 164 members, while a US operating outside the WTO carries no such obligation. The Appellate Body has been inoperative since late 2019, the Doha Round has been unfinished for about 25 years, and the March 2026 Ministerial Conference failed to agree a joint declaration. Zhou's conclusion is not collapse but 'managed decay', with multilateral rule-making giving way to plurilateral agreements.

Blind spot

What the West misses: Beijing positions itself not as the champion of the multilateral system but as the only major player still obliged to follow its rules; the GATT Article I argument explains why China's hands are tied in bilateral tariff bargaining with the US. Weakness: the piece never mentions China's industrial subsidies, overcapacity or the debate over its 2001 accession commitments, and the platform belongs to a foundation with ties to Beijing.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

Zhou's reading suggests Beijing expects no rescue from the WTO and is preparing for a world of plurilateral deals and regional blocs. It indicates that China sees the WTO in its bilateral tariff talks with the US as a burden rather than a bargaining chip. The most likely direction is a WTO that remains custodian of baseline commitments while new rules are written between blocs.

Likely effects

  • Global trade rulesNegative6 months+

    With the Appellate Body shut since 2019, US tariffs on 60 partners and the EU carbon levy are moving disputes from law to bargaining.

  • Türkiye's exportsNegative1–6 months

    The EU carbon regime and supply-chain preferences create compliance costs outside the WTO for Türkiye as an exporter to the EU.

  • Plurilateral dealsUncertain6 months+

    The WTO's shift into a platform for plurilateral agreements gives middle-sized countries room to choose their own blocs in digital trade and green industry.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Managed decay60%

    The WTO keeps its role on baseline commitments and transparency, while new rules are written in regional and plurilateral agreements.

    Watch: Appointments of Appellate Body judges being blocked again

  2. 2
    Bilateral order prevails25%

    US–China bilateral trade deals effectively hollow out the WTO's most-favoured-nation principle.

    Watch: The US–China trade truce turning into a deal outside the WTO

  3. 3
    Institutional recovery15%

    Members agree to rebuild the dispute settlement system.

    Watch: A time-bound agreement on dispute settlement reform

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: chinausfocus.com · 2 October 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.