Russian diesel ties Ankara's fuel security to a Washington–Moscow bargain

The noise is in sanctions, the signal in the diesel line

The headlines are about Washington. On 16 October President Trump suspended the Russia section of the Graham Act. Additional tariffs of up to 500% on Russian goods, and of up to 100% on the five biggest buyers of Russian oil and gas, were due to take effect on 18 October. CREA's September data put Türkiye fourth among those buyers, with purchases of 1.0 billion euros. The first reading is that the tariff threat hanging over Türkiye has gone.

That reading misses two things. The first is duration. Rubio described the waiver on 18 October as a temporary 60-day pause. Diplomacy and Law reads the order differently: it sets no fixed end date and stays in force until a new decision. The second is that the real fragility lies in physical supply rather than tariffs. Türkiye's purchases of Russian refined products fell 12% month on month in September, to their lowest since June 2022.

Constraint 1 · A fuel system built on imported diesel

EPDK data reported by Dünya show August diesel imports up 9.03% year on year to 1,166,792 tonnes. Refinery output rose 7.26% in the same month, yet diesel exports collapsed by 88.74%. Domestic diesel sales grew 4.42%. The picture is clear. Refineries are producing more, but domestic demand still cannot be met without imported diesel.

For a long time Russia filled that gap. According to EPDK data cited by İmamoğlu Haber, Russia supplied 85% of Türkiye's diesel imports in 2025, or 281,000 barrels a day. Kpler figures show the flow running above 200,000 barrels a day from January, before dropping to 100,000 in July and 80,000 in August. Russia's share fell to 20%. US and Indian cargoes filled the gap. That data is dated 29 August, and the September breakdown has not yet been published.

Bayraktar touched exactly this nerve in Moscow on 17 October. As reported by Türkiye Today, the minister described Türkiye as a major importer of Russian diesel and called the US–Russia diesel deal important for supply security. In effect, Ankara is openly admitting that part of its own diesel deficit now rests on an agreement between two other capitals.

Constraint 2 · Russian refining on the front line

The physical base of the diesel deal sits on Ukraine's target list. Reuters, as reported by the Kyiv Independent, says Ryazan's CDU-6, one of the refinery's main units, stopped after an attack on 15 October. The plant had already been hit on 15 May, 29 July and 6 September this year. On the night of 18 October drones set fire to the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, which handles 12.5 million tonnes of product a year.

The strikes are no longer confined to refineries. They now reach the export link, which narrows Russia's capacity to honour its diesel commitments to the world market. According to ABC News, the deal envisages Russia supplying hundreds of thousands of tonnes of diesel to the US and global markets, and the Treasury licence runs until April. For Türkiye the consequence is simple. As Russian product thins out, the gap is closed by more distant and more expensive routes.

Constraint 3 · Washington's calendar

The waiver offers Türkiye relief, but it moves the dependency onto another capital's timetable. The Senate passed the act by 86 votes to 11, and ABC News reports that Republican senators also openly opposed the waiver. Diplomacy and Law notes that the order did not designate Türkiye for the 100% tariff; if the waiver is withdrawn, that designation returns to the table. The same source says two Türkiye-based trading firms were among the individuals and entities the EU added to its sanctions list on 15 October.

Our reading is that Türkiye's energy risk does not sit in the sanctions text. It sits on two separate switches. One is Kyiv's campaign against refineries, the other Washington's waiver, which hinges on energy prices. Ankara controls neither.

The MPC link · How the bill travels

According to AA, the CBRT's 16 October survey of 71 participants lifted the October CPI expectation from 1.97% to 2.11%. The 12-month-ahead expectation rose from 23.70% to 23.89%. The expected policy rate is 36% for the first meeting, 35% for the second and 34.35% for the third. The year-end current account deficit expectation stands at 48.5 billion dollars, and the energy bill is its most volatile component.

Diesel is the energy item that passes through to prices fastest, via transport and agriculture. As more distant suppliers replace Russian product, freight and insurance costs reach the pump. That in turn limits the CBRT's easing path through the expectations channel. There are medium-term buffers, but they will not arrive in time for this winter. Bayraktar says Akkuyu's first unit will come online within a few months, and Black Sea gas is approaching 7.5 billion cubic metres a year. Both ease the power and gas balance; neither touches the diesel gap.

What comes next

The first test is the MPC decision on 22 October. EPDK's September petroleum market report will then show the country breakdown of diesel imports, revealing whether Russia's share has slipped below 20%. Rubio's 60-day frame runs to mid-December, and the Treasury's diesel licence is valid until April. October CPI, due in early November, will test how much of the 2.11% monthly rise expected in the survey comes from energy.