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The Suez Canal and surrounding desert and farmland seen from space

III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceMiddle East and North Africa

Iranian analyst argues a new war would cost Washington more than stalemate

Suez Canal, Egypt — seen from the ISS (March 2016)Photo: NASA / Tim Kopra (ISS Expedition 46) · Public domain · Source
Institution
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJCS)
Author
Arash Marzbanmehr
Country · language
Qatar · English
Affiliation
Linked to Qatari state-funded media

Summary

In an analysis published by the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies on 7 November, Arash Marzbanmehr, a senior analyst at the Meshkat think-tank, asks whether the US and Israel will launch another major operation against Iran. In his view, the war that began on 28 February damaged Iran's military power and infrastructure but did not end its deterrence. Nor did it resolve the nuclear file or the Hormuz problem. The author notes that Washington has sent two ships to the region and that two more aircraft carriers are expected to join by the end of November.

He lists signs of recovery on the Iranian side. Citing a Times of Israel report of 31 May, the analysis says the entrances to 18 missile bases have been reopened. A 15 September estimate by the US Congressional Budget Office put the cost of the war at 38 billion dollars and found that two-thirds of the US interceptor stockpile had been used up. The author highlights a meeting in Tehran on 26 October between officials from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye. It was Tehran's first high-level contact with three members of the Mecca defence pact.

The analysis sets out three scenarios. The first is a blockade and economic pressure continuing without war; the second, short strikes to regain freedom of movement around Hormuz; the third, a broad escalation that also targets buried nuclear sites. The author argues that a broad escalation is more feasible before 3 January 2027, when the new Congress convenes. Democratic majorities in both chambers, a depleted interceptor stockpile and energy market risk all make a large campaign expensive. The cost of pressure is visible in Europe too; according to the analysis, Italian inflation has risen to 5.4% and energy inflation to 31.4%. The path the author considers most likely is a conflict that stays below the threshold of full war and resembles the first scenario.

Blind spot

The author comes from an Iranian think-tank, and the piece was published by a centre funded by the Qatari state. The analysis rests Iran's recovery claims largely on isolated reports in the Israeli and US press; Iranian claims to have downed US drones have not been independently verified. The text offers no figures on how mine and tanker attacks in Hormuz have altered the blockade, or on how many months Iran's economy can withstand it.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

This reading from the Gulf sees Washington's constraint as political and logistical rather than military. A two-thirds depletion of the interceptor stockpile and the shift in the balance of Congress on 3 January make a large campaign expensive. That makes an in-between state, in which the blockade persists but full war does not break out, the most likely outcome. Risk is concentrated in the window before 3 January and in the chance that a naval incident triggers escalation.

Likely effects

  • Gulf energy exitsNegativeWeeks

    While the blockade continues without war, passage through Hormuz stays restricted; the analysis notes that three pumping stations on the East-West pipeline that bypasses Hormuz have already been hit, so the backup route is at risk too.

  • US air defence stocksNegative1–6 months

    The estimate that two-thirds of interceptors have been used up limits how quickly new air defence systems can be delivered to Israel and Gulf partners.

  • European inflationNegative1–6 months

    Energy inflation of 31.4% in Italy shifts the cost onto European central banks and budgets the longer the conflict lasts.

  • TürkiyeUncertain1–6 months

    Its seat at the 26 October Tehran meeting leaves Ankara exposed to pressure from two directions in an escalation, as both mediator and member of the Mecca pact.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Blockade persists without full war55%

    The US maintains the blockade and economic pressure while Iran preserves its deterrence; an in-between state oscillating between diplomacy and naval incidents continues.

    Watch: CENTCOM statements on the blockade and UKMTO's weekly count of attacks in Hormuz

  2. 2
    A limited round of strikes30%

    The US carries out brief strikes to regain freedom of movement around Hormuz, and Iran responds in a limited way.

    Watch: The number of US aircraft carriers in the region rising to three, and new strikes on Iranian coastal targets

  3. 3
    Broad escalation15%

    Before 3 January 2027 a broad campaign begins that also targets buried nuclear sites, and Iran strikes Gulf energy infrastructure.

    Watch: An announced strike on buried sites, or new attacks on pipelines that bypass Hormuz

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: studies.aljazeera.net · 7 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.