India is not thawing with China but managing ties sector by sector

Summary

Shibani Mehta, a geopolitical risk analyst at Control Risks, wrote on 25 September 2026 in The Strategist, published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). She argues that the recent warming between New Delhi and Beijing should not be read as a rise in strategic trust. In her view, India manages its relationship with China not through a single strategy but sector by sector, and the clearest evidence lies in regulation. For example, four China-linked electrical equipment makers with manufacturing plants in India have been temporarily allowed to bid for some transmission line tenders to ease supply shortages. Restrictions on telecoms and digital platforms, by contrast, remain in place; apps such as TikTok, banned after the border clashes, are still prohibited.

Mehta cites three separate regulatory tracks. On capital, Press Note 3, issued in 2020, requires government approval for investment from countries that share a land border with India. This year's amendment exempted small investments from approval, but the rule remains in effect a China-specific screening tool. In trade, India depends on Chinese inputs for pharmaceuticals, electronics and solar panels. In the solar sector it is trying to reduce that dependence over time through anti-dumping duties, meaning extra tariffs on imports sold below market value, and local content requirements. Tension on the border eased in 2024, but security concerns have not been resolved. The author accepts that this pattern may stem from bureaucratic inertia rather than deliberate coordination, but argues that its consistency weakens the case for coincidence.