I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsEurasia
A Russian sinologist at Valdai sees China trade nearing a plateau
- Institution
- Valdai Discussion Club
- Author
- Yana Leksyutina
- Country · language
- Russia · English
- Affiliation
- State-linked platform
Summary
In a piece published by Valdai on 9 November, Yana Leksyutina, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, tracks Russia–China trade using Chinese statistics. Trade grew 2.5-fold between 2020 and 2023, from $108 billion to $240 billion. Growth slowed to 1.9% in 2024, and volume contracted 6.9% in 2025. In January–August 2026, however, it rose 28.4% year on year to $185 billion.
The author does not read this jump as structural change. In her view, the main driver is energy market volatility caused by the Middle East and Venezuela crises, and a general rise in prices. She expects $270–280 billion for 2026: a record, but only slightly above 2024. Looking further ahead, she expects trade to plateau at around today's level. Chinese direct investment in Russia rose from $10 billion in 2022 to about $16 billion at the end of 2024.
On energy, the author highlights China's goal of self-sufficiency. Beijing plans to keep coal at 40% or more of consumption over the next decade and to generate 30% of its electricity from alternative sources by 2030. It has 64 reactors in operation and 37 under construction. Russian electricity exports to China have declined since 2023 and stopped entirely in January 2026, as China reserves power for its own growth, including AI data centres. The author argues that secondary sanctions matter less than domestic policy priorities.
Blind spot
The piece gives no figures for the currencies used in payments or for China's share of Russian foreign trade, and it does not measure the concrete cost of sanctions risk in the banking channel. It attributes the 2026 rise to price effects without separating volume from price. It acknowledges that Russian hydrocarbons are sold to China at a discount but does not give its size. Valdai is a state-linked platform, and a tendency to play down the impact of sanctions may be part of that framing.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The piece's real claim is that the 28.4% rise in January–August 2026 is not a lasting gain for Moscow. Growth comes from the price effect of the Gulf crisis, and China is moving towards energy self-sufficiency. The halt in electricity exports in January 2026 is the first concrete sign. With January Brent down to $92.63 on 11 November, the most likely path is that trade volumes drift back to 2024 levels as the crisis premium fades.
Likely effects
- Russia's energy revenueNegative1–6 months
Discounted hydrocarbon sales to China and Beijing's turn to coal and nuclear will pull Russia's China energy revenue back to 2024 levels once the crisis premium fades.
- Trade with TürkiyeUncertain1–6 months
The author counts Türkiye alongside China and India among Russia's main trading partners; if the China channel plateaus, trade through Türkiye could gain relative importance for Moscow.
- Logistics and insurance infrastructureUncertain6 months+
The author writes that finance, shipping and insurance infrastructure to counter secondary sanctions is still being built; as it grows, the weight of the Western insurance constraint on Russia–China trade declines.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Record in 2026, then a plateau55%
2026 volume reaches the author's $270–280 billion range, and growth stalls in 2027 as oil prices ease.
Watch: China customs data on Russia trade for January–October 2026 and January Brent closes around $90
- 2Falling prices break volumes early30%
Gulf tensions ease, energy prices fall and 2026 closes below $270 billion.
Watch: Year-on-year growth in China's monthly imports from Russia falling to single digits between September and November
- 3New deals carry volumes higher15%
Pipeline or investment agreements tie China's energy demand to Russia and trade breaks through the plateau.
Watch: Announcement of a binding price and volume agreement for the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: valdaiclub.com · 12 November 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.