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I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsMiddle East and North Africa

Gulf Research Center says Riyadh wants pressure from Beijing, not appeals

Suez Canal, Egypt — seen from the ISS (March 2016)Photo: NASA / Tim Kopra (ISS Expedition 46) · Public domain · Source
Institution
Gulf Research Center (GRC)
Author
Layla Ali
Country · language
Gulf (Saudi Arabia) · English
Affiliation
Independent think tank

Summary

In a commentary on 12 November, GRC senior researcher Layla Ali weighs Saudi Arabia's opening to China. Her starting point is the meeting in Beijing on 2 November. That day Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Saudi National Security Adviser Musaed bin Mohammed al-Aiban, who carried a letter from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Xi Jinping. Wang said he supported dialogue and a regional security architecture. Around the same time he also met Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, and reiterated his support for Iranian sovereignty.

The author's thesis is that both countries want regional stability, but their threat perceptions and willingness to bear costs differ. Riyadh's priority is to put into practice the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement reached through Chinese mediation in March 2023. That deal includes pledges to respect sovereignty and not interfere in internal affairs, but no formal Chinese security guarantee. In Riyadh's eyes, Houthi attacks on the Kingdom violate the spirit of the deal. Saudi Arabia expects China to apply concrete pressure on Iran to rein in its proxies.

China's order of priorities is different. For Beijing, energy supply, commercial ties with the Gulf, its relationship with Iran and rivalry with the United States come first. That is why it opts for calls for dialogue rather than direct pressure on Iran. The author links the Saudi opening to doubts about the US security commitment, but argues that Beijing cannot dispel those doubts on its own. She also sees Qatar's channel to Washington and Tehran as a tool that complements China's initiative.

Blind spot

The commentary contains no trade, oil volume or investment figures; the author weighs the relationship's economic heft without measuring it. She does not explicitly name China's position as a buyer of Iranian oil, which is Beijing's real leverage over Tehran. Nor does she discuss how transit risk in Hormuz alters the calculations of the two capitals. Her reference to Vision 2030 comes without numbers.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The Saudi reading sees China not as a security provider but as the only outside power able to influence Iran, yet Beijing's willingness to use that influence is limited. The 2 November meeting shows the channel is open, not that it produces results. The most likely path is that China sticks to the language of dialogue while Riyadh tries to close its security gap through US and Qatari channels.

Likely effects

  • Gulf security architectureNegative1–6 months

    China's refusal to offer a formal security guarantee leaves Riyadh dependent on the US commitment and Qatari mediation.

  • Energy supplyNegativeWeeks

    As Houthi attacks and Iran-driven escalation threaten Gulf infrastructure and shipping, energy flows, China's most sensitive interest, remain at risk.

  • TürkiyePositive1–6 months

    Riyadh's strategy of keeping several channels open leaves room for Ankara to play a complementary mediating role in Gulf security.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Language of dialogue persists60%

    Beijing confines itself to general appeals to Iran; Riyadh keeps the China channel open but secures no concrete gains.

    Watch: Whether China's foreign ministry condemns Houthi attacks by name

  2. 2
    China applies limited pressure25%

    To protect energy supply, Beijing privately tells Tehran to rein in the Houthis, and Houthi attacks decline.

    Watch: A marked drop in the frequency of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory

  3. 3
    Rapprochement unravels15%

    Escalation renders the March 2023 deal inoperative and Riyadh leans once more on the US security umbrella.

    Watch: Suspension of ambassador-level contacts between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: grc.net · 12 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.