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The North façade of the White House with its fountain

III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceAmericas

The world on the road to the 81st UN General Assembly: record conflict, record armament, slowing trade

The White House, north façade, Washington (July 2007)Photo: Nishkid64 / Wikimedia Commons · Public domain · Source
Institution
Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI)
Author
Laís Ramalho, Helena Psomopoulos, Maria Fernanda Ferreira, Julia Soares, Lucas Gribel
Country · language
Brazil · Portuguese
Affiliation
Independent think tank (Rio)

Summary

CEBRI's five-page briefing note, published on 22 September, sets out the backdrop to the 81st UN General Assembly (22–28 September) under four headings. On climate, drawing on the UNFCCC's September 2026 report, it now treats overshooting the 1.5°C limit as unavoidable: even in the optimistic scenario the end-of-century peak is +1.8°C, and without effective adaptation global food production could fall by up to 14% by 2050. On conflict, using Uppsala data, it records 2025 as the most violent year since 1946: 65 state-based armed conflicts in 35 countries, 245,000 direct battle deaths (188,000 in 2024) and 76,500 civilian deaths from one-sided violence, the highest count since the Rwandan genocide.

On armament, according to SIPRI's April 2026 data, world military expenditure rose by 2.9% in real terms in 2025 to 2,887 billion dollars, reaching 2.5% of global GDP; while the US cut spending by 7.5%, the world excluding the US increased it by 9.2%, with Europe leading at 14% and the Americas falling by 6.6%. The note stresses that Brazil, despite this regional decline, raised spending by 13% to 23.9 billion dollars, and that the US–China spending gap narrowed from 3.2 times to 2.8 times. On trade, based on the WTO's March 2026 forecast, it shows merchandise trade volume growth slowing from 4.6% in 2025 to 1.9% in 2026, though no scenario foresees a contraction, and the share of trade conducted at most-favoured-nation tariffs falling from about 83% in 2022 to about 72% in February 2026.

Blind spot

What the West misses: North Atlantic readings treat the US cut in military spending as a burden-sharing debate; seen from Brazil, the real story is the rest of the world arming at 9.2% and the erosion of rules (most-favoured-nation trade). Weakness: the note compiles data without policy proposals, does not question Brazil's rising naval spending or the climate–conflict link, and relays all figures from secondary sources (UNFCCC, UCDP, SIPRI, WTO).

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The CEBRI note shows in figures that the General Assembly convenes at a moment where record conflict and armament intersect with a less rules-based trading order. The US cutting spending while other regions arm rapidly points to the security burden being distributed in a multipolar fashion. No binding outcome is expected from the General Assembly; the trends will persist.

Likely effects

  • Defence spendingNegative6 months+

    Increases of 9.2% in the world excluding the US and 14% in Europe indicate that order demand for defence industries will stay high and that other items in public budgets will be squeezed.

  • Global tradeNegative1–6 months

    Merchandise trade growth dropping to 1.9% and the most-favoured-nation share falling to 72% mean weaker growth support for export-driven emerging economies.

  • Reading for TürkiyeUncertain6 months+

    Europe's 14% rise in armament creates an export opportunity for the Turkish defence industry, while the erosion of rules-based trade makes the export model built on the customs union with the EU more fragile against new tariffs.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Trends persist65%

    The General Assembly closes with declarations; rising military spending and trade fragmentation continue into 2027.

    Watch: A 12th consecutive record year in SIPRI's April 2027 military expenditure data

  2. 2
    Trade recovery20%

    Tariff tensions ease and merchandise trade in 2027 approaches or exceeds the WTO's 2.6% forecast.

    Watch: The WTO's October 2026 trade forecast update

  3. 3
    Decline in conflicts15%

    Ceasefires on major fronts bring the 2026 death toll clearly below that of 2025.

    Watch: UCDP conflict fatality data for 2026

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: cebri.org · 22 September 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.