Cairo sees Hormuz as a fight over who writes the post-war rules — Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS)

The Suez Canal and surrounding desert and farmland seen from space — Suez Canal, Egypt — seen from the ISS (March 2016)Photo: NASA / Tim Kopra (ISS Expedition 46) · Public domain · Source

Institution: Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS)
Author: Galal Nassar
Country · language: Egypt · Arabic
Affiliation: State-aligned think tank (Cairo)

Summary

In an analysis published on 27 September 2026 by the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS) in Cairo, Galal Nassar, head of its Arab Studies Unit, argues that the US–Iran conflict no longer revolves around the date of the next strike. In his view, the real question is who will write the post-war rules. Nassar notes that Trump, addressing some 130 leaders at the UN General Assembly, both threatened to destroy Iran and predicted a historic deal after the 3 November election. He writes that the Western press has counted at least 8 similar swings in the 7 months since the war began in late February. Drawing on Schelling's concept of compellence, the author stresses that military force alone cannot deliver a political outcome.

The Strait of Hormuz sits at the centre of the analysis. Nassar argues that the strait has shifted from a military lever to an object of negotiation. Iran has said it is ready to reopen it within 7 days if military pressure eases and the blockade of its ports is lifted. The author notes that oil prices fell on 22 September on expectations of higher supply, and that Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline has partly resumed operation. He contends that the Gulf states want neither Iran nor the US to hold a monopoly over the keys to the transit routes. His proposal is a 3-step negotiating ladder. Navigation, energy and mutual attacks come first, then sanctions and the nuclear programme, and finally the regional security order, in which the Gulf should be a founding party.

Blind spot

What the West misses: while the Western debate asks whether the US will strike Iran, this reading casts the Gulf states as the legitimate guardians of transit security and warns that the war's end could breed a new one. Weakness: beyond a few dated facts, it gives no transit counts or price figures and cites no sources. Egypt's Suez revenues and own interests go unmentioned; Cairo's government-aligned line is freer criticising US domestic politics.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The analysis treats the reopening of Hormuz not as a technical matter but as the first bargaining chip in the post-war Gulf order. Iran's 7-day reopening offer and the US blockade stand as counterweights to each other. The most likely direction is a phased arrangement limited to navigation and energy rather than a comprehensive deal. Yet the timetable Trump has tied to the 3 November election prolongs the uncertainty.

Likely effects

Oil pricesUncertainWeeks
Every sign that the strait could reopen pulls prices down at once; the 22 September drop shows how sensitive the market is to political signals.
Gulf export routesPositive1–6 months
The partial restart of Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline reduces dependence on Hormuz, but makes the security of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb just as important.
Türkiye's energy billUncertain1–6 months
For Türkiye, an energy importer, a phased reopening of the strait would ease price pressure; a deal pushed beyond the election would delay that relief.

Possibilities, ranked

1
Phased navigation arrangement50%
Rather than a comprehensive deal, the parties take a limited step that trades the reopening of the strait for an easing of the blockade.
Watch: Washington's formal response to Iran's 7-day reopening offer and the status of the blockade on Iranian ports
2
Limbo until the election30%
Threats and talk of a deal keep alternating, transits through the strait stay low, and the decision is postponed until after 3 November.
Watch: Whether the number of commercial ships transiting Hormuz approaches pre-war levels
3
Uncontrolled escalation20%
An incident such as a broad Israeli strike or a hit on a US ship draws Washington into a war on a scale it did not plan for.
Watch: An Israeli decision on a large-scale strike on Iran, or an incident involving US assets in the strait

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: ecss.com.eg · 27 September 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.