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Container cranes and a ship at the Port of Djibouti at sunset

III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceSub-Saharan Africa

Africa has sent more Red Sea envoys but gained little sway, says ISS

Container terminal at the Port of Djibouti (December 2015)Photo: Skilla1st / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Institute for Security Studies (ISS Today)
Author
Moses Chrispus Okello
Country · language
Ethiopia / Africa · English
Affiliation
Independent think tank

Summary

Writing on 21 October, Moses Chrispus Okello of ISS Addis Ababa argues that the Houthis (Ansarullah) shattered a core assumption when they seized control of the Bab el-Mandeb in September. The insurgency, he says, can no longer be treated as a northern Yemeni affair. Their ties to al-Shabaab now disrupt a passage that carries roughly 15% of global trade. Conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia have become entangled with the crises of the Middle East.

Okello notes that the two shores reach for different tools. In March the African Union appointed Jakaya Kikwete, Tanzania's former president, as High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. IGAD has its own envoys for Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, alongside envoys from the UN, the EU, China, Japan and 6 European states. The author calls this crowd "envoy inflation" and argues it delivers little. Middle Eastern states, by contrast, have moved to military frameworks. Saudi Arabia launched the 14-member Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition on 30 July. On 7 August, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

According to the author, Saudi Arabia conducted its first military operation against the Houthis under that agreement on 5 October. Eritrea left IGAD in December 2025, while landlocked Ethiopia and the UAE sit outside both frameworks. Okello stresses that African envoy missions are temporary and depend on donor funding, whereas Middle Eastern states pay for their own interventions. He urges the AU and IGAD to rethink their maritime mechanisms and to streamline their diplomacy.

Blind spot

The piece measures the Red Sea disruption by share of trade, not by freight, insurance or Suez transit data. It mentions Türkiye's naval defence role in Somalia and the Mecca agreement, but does not examine Ankara's interests on the African coast. Nor does it identify how African states would fund navies of their own.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The piece shows Red Sea security passing from African institutions to Gulf-centred military frameworks. The 14-member coalition and the Mecca agreement concentrate decision-making in Riyadh, while Africa's envoys stay bogged down in internal conflicts. The most likely path is a continued reliance by the Horn of Africa on outside powers for maritime security.

Likely effects

  • Maritime tradeNegative1–6 months

    Africa's weak voice over a passage carrying roughly 15% of global trade leaves route security dependent on the Gulf and on foreign navies.

  • TürkiyeUncertain1–6 months

    As a party to the Mecca agreement and Somalia's naval defence partner, Türkiye takes on a bridging role between Africa and the Gulf in the Red Sea.

  • Regional institutionsNegative6 months+

    Eritrea's exit from IGAD and donor-dependent envoy missions further erode the influence of the AU and IGAD in the Red Sea.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Gulf framework strengthens60%

    The Saudi-led coalition expands and African states join one by one, but IGAD as an institution stays outside.

    Watch: A new African member of the coalition, or a new operation under the Mecca agreement

  2. 2
    AU maritime mechanism25%

    The AU and IGAD fold their scattered envoy missions into a single Red Sea mechanism.

    Watch: A Red Sea decision by the AU Peace and Security Council

  3. 3
    Coastal conflict15%

    Ethiopia's demand for sea access escalates tensions with Eritrea and Egypt to a military level.

    Watch: Reports of troop build-ups on the Ethiopia–Eritrea border

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: issafrica.org · 21 October 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.