
I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsSouth Asia
ME Council: India diversified its suppliers but not its routes
- Institution
- Middle East Council on Global Affairs
- Author
- Institutional publication
- Country · language
- Qatar · English
- Affiliation
- Doha-based independent institution
Summary
On 3 November the Doha-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs published an unsigned situation assessment of India's exposure to the Gulf. According to the report, India's goods trade with the Gulf came to about 207.8 billion dollars in fiscal 2025-26. That is 17.1% of total trade; one in every five dollars of imports goes to the region. Before the war, about half of India's crude and about 90% of its LPG imports passed through Hormuz.
The council judges India's initial response successful but temporary. The share of crude arriving by routes that bypass Hormuz rose from 55% to 70% within a few weeks; in August Russia became the largest supplier with a share above 40%. The strategic petroleum reserve, however, covers only about 9.5 days of net imports, and there is no strategic gas reserve at all. Attacks on Ras Laffan knocked out about 17% of Qatar's export capacity; repairs could take 3–5 years.
The macroeconomic cost is also quantified. The rupee hit a record low of 93 to the dollar in March, and foreign funds pulled out about 11 billion dollars a month. The RBI cut its 2026-27 growth forecast to 6.7% and projects inflation of 5.0%. About 10 million Indians live in the Gulf, and 1.1 million had returned home by 20 April.
The report sees a persistent grey zone as the most likely path over 6–12 months: limited, escorted transits through Hormuz and selective attacks in Bab el-Mandeb. Its recommendation is to diversify routes before suppliers; Omani ports outside the two straits stand out. It also suggests that India seek a quiet understanding with Riyadh so that the Mecca defence pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August is not extended to Kashmir.
Blind spot
The report recommends route diversification but does not price the fact that the Omani coast has also been hit. The Indian-flagged Al Jusufi was struck off Lima, Oman, on 2 November, and October was the war's record month with at least 30 attacks. Insurance premiums and war-risk surcharges are not mentioned at all. It notes as a constraint that the 40% share from Russia depends on a temporary US waiver, but gives no expiry date for the waiver.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The report correctly identifies India's real gap: suppliers have been diversified, routes have not. A 9.5-day oil reserve and zero gas reserve mean any new disruption feeds straight into prices and fertiliser production. The proposed Omani outlet is also within range of attack. The likeliest path is that balance holds while the waiver for Russian oil lasts, but the buffer thins.
Likely effects
- Indian energy securityNegativeWeeks
With a 9.5-day strategic reserve, a new Hormuz disruption would make India even more dependent on the spot market and Russian crude.
- Fertiliser and foodNegative1–6 months
Gas supply to fertiliser plants down to 70% of pre-war levels, with about 80% of ammonia sourced from the region, creates cost pressure in the sowing season.
- Gulf security architectureUncertain6 months+
Pakistan's deployment to the Gulf under the Mecca pact, with India left outside, makes a structure that includes Türkiye a diplomatic problem for India.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Grey zone persists60%
Hormuz stays open on a limited, escorted basis; India maintains balance with Russian oil, but its reserve and currency buffers thin.
Watch: Russian crude's monthly share of Indian imports and whether the US waiver is extended
- 2Interim arrangement25%
An interim arrangement is reached for Hormuz, the Saudi pipeline is repaired and Gulf imports gradually regain their former share.
Watch: A new date for the postponed Salalah talks
- 3Wider conflict15%
Pakistan launches direct operations against the Houthis, and oil, gas and remittance channels are disrupted together.
Watch: A Pakistani military statement on direct operations against Yemen
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: mecouncil.org · 3 November 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.