Russian gas contracts expire at year-end, and Europe's ban is Ankara's leverage

The bargaining has begun

Presenting the National Energy 2040 plan on 5 November, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said Türkiye was buying less Russian and more US gas because of price. According to the Kyiv Independent on 6 November, the minister described Russian gas as extremely expensive. The price Ankara paid Gazprom in 2026 is not public, so the claim itself could not be verified.

The timing matters more than the claim. On 6 November CREA analyst Isaac Levi read the remark as a bargaining message to Moscow, and the emphasis on US LNG purchases as a signal to Washington. As of 7 November the contracts had 54 days to run, and the same week the minister unveiled a supply plan stretching to 2040.

The size of the contract

Bloomberg calculated in November 2025 that Gazprom's two contracts with BOTAŞ provide for deliveries of up to 21.75 billion cubic metres a year; actual shipments in 2024 were 21.6 billion cubic metres. Reuters reported on 4 December 2025 that Ankara had carried these contracts into 2026 with a one-year extension rather than a multi-year deal. Bayraktar said that day that the focus was on a short-term extension.

Russia's share is falling but in 2026 it is still the largest block. Reuters says it dropped from above 50% in 2018 to below 40% in 2025. A separate Reuters report from April 2026 put gas arriving via Blue Stream and TurkStream at about 35% of the total mix. Iran International's compilation puts Türkiye's annual demand at 50–60 billion cubic metres.

US supply is growing but is nowhere near the scale needed to replace 22 billion cubic metres. Reuters says the US became Türkiye's fourth-largest supplier in 2025 with 5.5 billion cubic metres. Bayraktar said in December 2025 that about 1,500 US cargoes were expected over 10–15 years, most indexed to Henry Hub, the US gas price benchmark. Those 1,500 cargoes do not remove the price risk in the Russian contract; they swap it for another, tied to a US index.

Ankara's leverage

Brussels supplies the leverage through its 2027 calendar: EU rules banning all imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG take effect in 2027. Levi argues that losing its biggest LNG customer in 2027 will force Russia to offer deeper discounts to its remaining buyers.

In November 2025 Bloomberg described Türkiye as the second-largest buyer of Russian pipeline gas after China and Europe's fourth-largest gas market. The same report said rising Black Sea output could leave Türkiye with more gas than it needs in the years up to 2030. Taken together, these facts suggest Gazprom has few options other than conceding on price to keep its 22 billion cubic metres.

The constraint is the calendar

What weakens Ankara's hand is timing: the contract expires on 31 December, at the peak of heating demand. Silivri holds 4.6 billion cubic metres and Tuz Gölü 1.7 billion, for total storage of 6.3 billion cubic metres. By Talay's calculation that covers about 3.4 months of Russian volumes running at 22 billion cubic metres a year. The latest published fill level is 71%, from March 2026; the November figure could not be verified.

The second pipeline also became uncertain in 2026. The 9.6 billion cubic metre contract on the Tabriz–Ankara line lapsed without renewal on 29 July 2026. Reuters says Türkiye took 7.6 billion cubic metres from Iran in 2025, 13% of its imports. Iran International says Türkiye received 4.536 billion cubic metres of Iranian gas in the first half of 2026, and industry sources say flows continue under a temporary force majeure arrangement.

Of Türkiye's two large pipeline contracts, then, one has already lapsed and the other ends within 54 days. US economic pressure on Iran could complicate the payment channel in winter 2026, leaving the marginal supply to Russian volumes and spot LNG. Ankara's preference for a one-year extension bought flexibility. But that flexibility also means renegotiating every year on the same winter calendar.

The fiscal channel and what it means for Türkiye

The gas price feeds straight into the budget. On 19 October Bayraktar said 1,000 cubic metres of gas cost about 1,000 dollars in Europe against a residential price of 220 dollars in Türkiye, with the gap covered by public money. He said Türkiye spent about 55–60 billion dollars on energy support in 2023–2026 and that the next price adjustment would come in April if possible.

The Treasury, which carries this subsidy, saw its room narrow in October. Data cited by Bloomberg HT show a cash deficit of 329.9 billion lira for the month, with interest payments of 279.1 billion lira, 74.5% higher than a year earlier. Any discount won on 22 billion cubic metres of Russian gas would lower BOTAŞ's costs and with them the subsidy burden weighing on the primary balance.

The calendar to watch runs 54 days. The decisive markers are an extension announcement from BOTAŞ or the Energy Ministry by mid-December, Russian and Iranian volumes in January EPDK data, the April 2027 tariff adjustment and the implementation timetable of the EU's 2027 ban. As in 2026, the price will not be disclosed. The size of any discount will have to be read indirectly, from BOTAŞ tariff decisions and the Treasury's primary balance.