
VI Energy Politics & Supply SecurityMiddle East and North Africa
Seen from the Gulf, reviving old pipelines is the way around Hormuz
- Institution
- Gulf Research Center (GRC)
- Author
- Naji Abi-Aad
- Country · language
- Gulf · English
- Affiliation
- Independent think tank (Jeddah)
Summary
In a commentary published on 29 September 2026, Naji Abi-Aad, senior energy adviser at the Gulf Research Center, draws the main lesson for the region from the Gulf conflict that began in February 2026. Oil that cannot be exported, he argues, has no value in being produced. With Hormuz effectively paralysed, crude leaving the region fell from about 20 million barrels a day to a small fraction of that. Throughout the crisis Saudi Arabia was the only producer able to sustain almost all its exports without passing through Hormuz. Iraq and the UAE could divert only part of their exports outside the strait, while Kuwait and Qatar remained wholly dependent on it. Abi-Aad does not find realistic US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's forecast in early September that Hormuz would become irrelevant within 2 years. For liquefied natural gas (LNG), he writes, there is no concrete alternative route in the next few years.
The author's proposal has two legs: repairing and commissioning pipelines built decades ago that now lie idle, and investing in new lines that bypass the strait. He wants the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, the organisation of the six Arab Gulf monarchies) to coordinate cost-sharing, pumping rights and transit fees. On storage, he proposes expanding oil and gas stocks both in producing countries and in major consuming countries. As an example of resilience he cites Saudi Arabia repairing, in under 10 days, 3 pumping stations on its East-West Pipeline that had been hit by a drone attack. Abi-Aad sets conditions: buried and parallel lines, AI-assisted leak detectors and ready stocks of spare parts, with each line benefiting source, transit and recipient countries alike.
Blind spot
What the West misses: the West reads Hormuz as a maritime security problem. The view from the Gulf stresses a different worry: that the US and Iran could use control of the strait as commercial leverage against Gulf LNG. The weakness of this reading: the piece gives no capacity, cost or route figures for any line, and does not openly discuss which states would be needed as transit countries or their political risk.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The GRC reading shows that since February 2026 the Gulf's export problem has stemmed from the exit route, not from production. Saudi Arabia sustaining almost full exports by pipeline while Kuwait and Qatar remain wholly dependent on the strait opens a resilience gap within the region. The most likely path is a gradual revival of idle oil pipelines, while LNG's dependence on Hormuz persists for years.
Likely effects
- LNG supplyNegative1–6 months
There is no concrete route other than Hormuz for Qatari and UAE LNG in the next few years; every disruption in the strait directly tightens global LNG supply.
- Divergence within the GulfUncertain1–6 months
Saudi Arabia, with pipelines, can keep exporting while Kuwait and Qatar stay dependent on the strait; that gap creates divergence in revenue and bargaining power among producers.
- Reading for TürkiyePositive6 months+
The piece calls for new lines through transit countries and stocks in consuming countries. That raises the chance of Türkiye coming to the table as a transit country on routes carrying Gulf and Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Gradual revival55%
Gulf states repair idle lines and bring them back into service nationally, but joint GCC investment in new lines moves slowly.
Watch: An official statement from Iraq, the UAE or Kuwait that an idle export line has been returned to service
- 2GCC-coordinated investment30%
The GCC announces a joint pipeline and storage programme, and a framework agreement on transit fees and cost-sharing is signed.
Watch: A reference in a GCC summit declaration to a joint pipeline or stock programme bypassing Hormuz
- 3Post-crisis complacency15%
Once the strait reopens, costly projects are postponed and dependence returns to pre-crisis levels.
Watch: Tenders for new lines suspended even as Hormuz transits return to pre-crisis levels
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: grc.net · 29 September 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.