A reading of Bab el-Mandeb from Ankara: the Houthis can now set the cost of transit without closing the strait — Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM)

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Institution: Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM)
Author: Kaan Devecioğlu
Country · language: Türkiye · English
Affiliation: Independent non-profit institute

Summary

In the article ORSAM published in English on 25 September, first released in Turkish on 21 September, Kaan Devecioğlu argues that the Houthis' capture of the port of Mocha and their advance towards Perim (Mayun) island and the Hanish islands has put Bab el-Mandeb back on the world agenda. According to the author, the real issue is not a few towns changing hands: if these 3 points are merged into a single military system and backed by anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial and naval vehicles, mines and coastal surveillance, they create a sea-denial capability that makes transit costly and unpredictable without physically closing the strait. The author notes that, according to IMF PortWatch data published on 18 September, 23 cargo vessels transited on 17 September, meaning traffic continues.

Devecioğlu links the second ring to Hormuz: redirecting Saudi oil through Yanbu to the Red Sea while Hormuz is under pressure means barrels bound for Asia still pass through Bab el-Mandeb; the two straits are now two weak links in the same energy chain. The article states that instead of the direct military intervention Riyadh expected, Washington has established contact with the Houthis in Oman, creating the risk of a selective transit regime, and lists 3 escalation scenarios: selective pressure, a Saudi-backed counter-offensive, and a permanent sea-denial architecture. For Türkiye, it concludes that because of naval training in Somalia, the Çağrı Bey drilling ship and the spaceport project, the strait is no longer a distant Yemeni matter.

Blind spot

What the West misses: while the West mostly reads Bab el-Mandeb as a freight and insurance issue, Ankara sees the strait as a security problem just north of its military, energy and space investments in Somalia. The weakness of this reading: the article does not quantify Houthi missile and unmanned vehicle stocks, Iran's resupply capacity or the trend in daily transits; a single day's figure of 23 vessels does not show a trend.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

The article's main thesis, that the Houthis set the cost of transit rather than close the strait, is consistent with market behaviour: traffic continues but insurance and routing decisions are tied to the perception of security. While pressure on Hormuz persists, the Yanbu outlet will remain dependent on Bab el-Mandeb, so every escalation in the Red Sea squeezes both routes for Gulf oil at once; for Türkiye, its presence in Somalia turns this risk into a direct security issue.

Likely effects

Freight and insuranceNegativeWeeks
The Houthis' positioning along the Mocha–Perim–Hanish line keeps war-risk premiums high even if the strait does not close and pushes some shipowners onto the Cape of Good Hope route.
Gulf oil exportsNegative1–6 months
Because Saudi oil moved to Yanbu to bypass Hormuz still passes through Bab el-Mandeb on its way to Asia, the alternative route does not provide full insurance in security terms.
Türkiye's presence in SomaliaNegative6 months+
Naval training in Somalia, the Çağrı Bey drilling and the spaceport project turn escalation at Bab el-Mandeb into a direct protection and risk-management issue for Ankara.

Possibilities, ranked

1
Selective pressure continues55%
The Houthis hold their gains and do not close the strait but apply selective pressure on vessels linked to Saudi Arabia; traffic continues in a volatile pattern.
Watch: IMF PortWatch daily Bab el-Mandeb transit count and reports of attacks on Saudi-linked vessels
2
Saudi-backed counter-offensive30%
Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launch a major counter-attack on the Mocha–Dhubab–Perim axis, and the area around the strait becomes an active combat zone.
Watch: Reports of ground operations and Saudi air strikes around Mocha and Dhubab
3
Permanent sea denial15%
The Houthis establish a permanent blocking system with mines, unmanned naval vehicles and coastal missiles, and shipowners voluntarily abandon the strait.
Watch: Mine detection at Bab el-Mandeb or an announcement of collective rerouting by major shipowners

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: orsam.org.tr · 25 September 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.