Russia's war economy squeezed at the port and in the budget: 90% of Krasnodar's grain export capacity out, 2027 gap closed with new taxes

The port front: after the refineries, grain

According to a report by The Moscow Times on 24 September, Krasnodar Governor Veniamin Kondratyev signed a decree on 23 September bringing a state of emergency into force retroactively from 12 August. The grounds cited were mass attacks on logistics facilities, the suspension of port operations and disruption to shipping in the Azov–Black Sea basin. According to sector analysts, August's drone and missile strikes knocked out about 90% of the region's grain export capacity. According to a Reuters report published by ThePrint, Krasnodar harvested 11.4 million tonnes of grain and pulses this year, about 2 million tonnes more than in 2025. Because the record harvest cannot be exported, it is piling up in the domestic market.

This picture shows that a second class of targets has opened up in Ukraine's long-range strikes. Since the start of September refineries had been the targets: after strikes on the Kuibyshev and Ufa refineries on 22 September, more than 45% of Russian refining capacity was reported to be out of action. According to a report by The Moscow Times on 23 September, regions are reinstating fuel purchase limits: there is a limit of 30 litres per vehicle in the Leningrad region and 15 litres in Zabaykalsky, and the petrol export ban has been extended to 31 January 2027. With the grain ports also out of action, Russia's war economy is being squeezed in both energy and agricultural exports at the same time.

Russia is seeking alternative routes to make up for this loss. According to The Moscow Times, fertiliser and coal terminals at Baltic and Arctic ports are being converted to handle grain arriving by rail from the south. These routes are longer and more expensive; daily shipment figures from Novorossiysk could not be verified tonight.

The budget front: the bill for the war goes to the taxpayer

On 24 September the Finance Ministry submitted the 2027–2029 draft budget to the government. According to The Moscow Times, the draft introduces a graduated 13–22% scale on deposit interest, dividends and securities gains, currently taxed at 13–15%, affecting about 4 million high earners; military personnel are exempt. It also proposes 22% VAT on cross-border online shopping and a flat fee of 100 roubles on parcels under 200 euros, a 35% tax on dividends paid to non-resident accounts and a 30% tax on the excess earnings of mining and metals companies.

Deficit estimates vary by source. The Moscow Times and Meduza put the 2027 deficit at 2% of GDP on an oil price assumption of 50 dollars a barrel, while the Reuters report published by Euronext says 2.2%; the discrepancy between the two figures could not be verified. According to Reuters, 2027 revenue is 43.3 trillion roubles and spending 48.8 trillion roubles; the 2026 deficit is expected to reach 3%, almost double the plan. According to the same report, the projections include a 5.4% contraction in fixed investment, the sharpest fall since 2015, a 0.2% decline in industrial output and 6.8% inflation.

The logic of the budget is clear: a financing model resting on oil revenue falls short in an environment where refineries and ports are being hit, and the deficit is being shifted onto the domestic tax base. This came immediately after the 21 September elections that secured a constitutional majority in the Duma; United Russia had reached up to 355 of the 450 seats.

Türkiye's place at the table

According to Reuters, the Kremlin said diplomatic contacts were continuing on Türkiye's proposal for the safe passage of grain in the Black Sea. Russia withdrew in 2023 from the Black Sea Grain Initiative of 2022. US Secretary of State Rubio said on 23 September, after talks with Lavrov, that both sides had shown interest in a limited ceasefire covering grain and energy targets. Attacks on commercial ships in the Black Sea are nonetheless continuing: with the strike on an Antigua-flagged cargo ship on 23 September, in which its Ukrainian captain was killed, the number of recorded attacks on ships rose to 226.

This combination gives Türkiye an opportunity to resume the mediating role it played in 2022, but the conditions are harder. First, this time both sides are striking each other's export infrastructure; safe passage would have to cover both Ukrainian and Russian ports. Second, Ukraine's exports for the 2026/27 season stood at 4.55 million tonnes as of 18 September, 20% behind the previous year, with wheat exports down 43%. Losses on both shores amplify the effect of Black Sea grain on world prices and carry the risk of raising input costs for Türkiye's flour and pasta industries; the size of this effect cannot yet be measured in figures.