
I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsAsia-Pacific
Tokyo fears a post-midterm squeeze from the US–China thaw
- Institution
- The Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)
- Author
- Kiyoyuki Seguchi
- Country · language
- Japan · Japanese
- Affiliation
- Corporate-funded independent institute
Summary
Kiyoyuki Seguchi is research director at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo. His article appeared in JBpress on 23 September 2026 and was posted on the CIGS website on 30 September. In it he relays the views of more than 10 former officials and academics he met over 4 days in Washington and Boston from 8 September. One former official told him that US China policy should now be read through the tension between the president and his own cabinet. Most of the cabinet takes a hard line on China. The president, however, wants an image of stability with Beijing before the 3 November midterm elections, because of the cost of living and petrol prices pushed up by the Iran war. The author notes that most of the advanced chip export restrictions inherited from the Biden era remain in place, while some have been eased by presidential decision.
Seguchi cites a Pew survey from March 2026 in which the share of Americans with a favourable view of China rose from 16% in 2024 to 27%. The share with an unfavourable view fell from 81% to 71%. He argues that the real risk begins after the election. If the Republicans suffer heavy losses, congressional pressure could grow. Reciprocal boycotts of the APEC summit hosted by China and the G20 summit hosted by the US could then come onto the agenda. He believes this volatility would hit Japan hardest. Orders from China to Japanese companies for AI and semiconductor parts have risen rapidly this year. He relays a warning that if decoupling pressure cuts off these sales, Japanese firms' competitiveness could decline within 2–3 years. His recommendation is to keep the alliance with the US on security while pursuing an economically open foreign policy in every direction.
Blind spot
What the West misses: the West reads US–China tech rivalry as a two-player game. This reading shows that Washington's swings between hard and soft phases push the real cost onto manufacturing allies caught in between. Weak spot: the interviewees are anonymous, and the warning of lost competitiveness within 2–3 years rests on a single company executive. The author also holds to an older line defending the China market and plays down the risk of Beijing's economic pressure on Japan.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The article expects US–China relations to stay stable until the 3 November midterm elections and to turn volatile afterwards. For Japan, the risk is renewed decoupling pressure and a halt to high-tech parts sales to China. The most likely course is a calm period until the election, followed by export restrictions returning to the agenda under congressional pressure.
Likely effects
- Japanese tech exportsNegative1–6 months
If AI and chip parts orders from China are cut off under decoupling pressure, Japanese firms could lose their place to Chinese rivals within 2–3 years.
- Multilateral summitsNegative1–6 months
Reciprocal boycotts of the APEC and G20 summits would weaken the institutional channels of US–China relations and leave arrangements such as the tariff truce fragile.
- In-between economies like TürkiyeUncertain6 months+
Swings in US policy create adjustment costs for allies that trade with China. Türkiye could face a similar squeeze in export control and supply chain decisions.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Calm until the election, then hardening50%
Rhetoric of stability continues until the midterms. After the vote, congressional pressure tightens chip export restrictions again and allies are asked to align.
Watch: The 3 November midterm results and subsequent congressional bills on export controls targeting China
- 2Extended stability35%
The president's preference stays decisive, congressional pressure does not change foreign policy, and US–China stability continues after the election.
Watch: Whether the US president attends the APEC summit in November
- 3Rupture through summit boycotts15%
The US skips APEC and China skips the G20. Relations deteriorate quickly and pressure on Japan to join decoupling intensifies.
Watch: The Chinese president's decision on attending the G20 summit in the US
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: cigs.canon · 23 September 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.